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LIABILITY FOR TORTS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW: NO HOOK UNDER SOSA FOR SECONDARY,
COMPLICIT ACTORS
HELENA LYNCH*
“This old but little used section is a kind of legal Lohengrin;
although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act . . .
no one seems to know whence it came.”1
I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), United States federal
courts provide a forum for causes of action brought by aliens for
torts committed in violation of international law.2  Until Sosa v. Al-
varez-Machain,3 however, it was not certain whether the ATS simply
provided a jurisdictional grant to the federal courts or a substantive
cause of action for violations of international law.4  In Sosa, the
United States Supreme Court held that while the statute does not
create a cause of action, the statute does provide a forum for a nar-
row field of already-recognized causes of action for “tort[s] . . . com-
mitted in violation of the law of nations.”5  The Court did not
address whether secondary actors — i.e., those complicit in the vio-
lations — could also be held liable under the ATS.  The most visible
of the current ATS cases, however, involve claims against complicit,
* J.D. New York Law School, 2005.
1. Circuit Judge Henry Friendly, referring to the Alien Tort Statute.  IIT v. Ven-
cap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
2. The statute reads: “The District Courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil claim by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States.”  28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
3. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
4. See id. at 713; Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
5. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 724.  This is a fine distinction: The petitioner, Humberto
Alvarez-Machain, contended that the statute itself was intended as authority for the cre-
ation of a new cause of action for torts in violation of international law. Id. at 713.  The
Court disagreed with this interpretation. Id.  The Court did agree, however, that torts
in violation of international law are recognized within the common law and that it is
these common law-defined causes of action in violation of international law that the
ATS authorizes federal courts to hear. Id. at 724.
757
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or secondary, actors who allegedly provided support to those who
violate the law of nations.6  Given Sosa’s narrow definition of what
may be recognized as a ‘tort committed in violation of the law of
nations,’ are there now any grounds under the ATS for holding
liable those who provide material support to the primary actors?
This Note contends that the standard set by Sosa effectively
renders complicity claims not actionable under the ATS.  Pre-Sosa,
the only complicity standard in international law arguably cogniza-
ble under the ATS was the aiding and abetting standard that was
developed by the International Tribunals for Rwanda and the for-
mer Yugoslavia.  The aiding and abetting standard ultimately fails,
however, to satisfy the criteria to constitute a cause of action under
the ATS as set forth in Sosa.  It is neither sufficiently universally rec-
ognized nor defined with sufficient specificity so as to satisfy Sosa.
This Note further contends that other asserted standards by
which to measure the liability of secondary actors under the ATS —
including domestic federal common law standards such as joint
venture liability and reckless disregard, and the state action analysis
under 42 U.S.C. § 19837 — are inapplicable.  Because the ATS is a
vehicle for a narrow class of causes of action in international law,
causes of action for complicity must be defined under international
law, not under domestic federal standards.
As a result, since neither the aiding and abetting nor other as-
serted standards for rendering liable secondary actors satisfy Sosa,
complicit actors are essentially untouchable under the ATS unless
they are in direct control of the primary actors.8
Part II of this Note examines the history of the ATS and the
debates regarding its current application.  Additionally, Part II dis-
cusses the extent to which Sosa has ratified the causes of action that
6. E.g., Doe v. Unocal, 110 F. Supp.2d 1294 (C.D. Cal. 2000) (villagers suing
Unocal Corporation as a complicit or secondary actor for providing support to the My-
anmar government’s violations of the law of nations), rev’d in part, aff’d in part, 395 F.3d
932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh’g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
7. Under the state action analysis, if the complicit actors were state actors, then
their conduct would violate international law for purposes of the ATS if the conduct of
the primary actors did as such. See Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 2002 WL 319887
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
8. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1996) (holding the defendant liable for
genocide based on his direct command of the primary actors).
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have been recognized to date under the ATS.  Part III discusses the
need to settle on a workable standard for determining alleged com-
plicity in violations of international law.  Part IV examines the vari-
ous approaches taken by courts to assess liability against indirect
actors, and the international precedent and legal authority for the
aiding and abetting standard.  Finally, Part IV discusses why there is
no standard for complicity cognizable under the ATS.
II. A HISTORY OF THE ALIEN TORT STATUTE AND
THE IMPACT OF SOSA V. ALVAREZ-MACHAIN
The original version of the ATS was enacted as part of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789, drafted by the first Congress.9  As it stands today,
the statute provides that “[t]he district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed
in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”10
Remarking on the mystery surrounding the ATS, Judge Henry
Friendly of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit wrote, “[t]his old and little used section is a kind of legal Lo-
hengrin; although it has been with us since the first Judiciary Act
. . . no one seems to know whence it came.”11  Like Lohengrin,12
the statute remained hidden, its identity nearly unknown for almost
two hundred years, until a Paraguayan woman journeyed to New
York and pursued the Paraguayan police inspector who had tor-
tured and murdered her younger brother in Paraguay.13  Her jour-
ney resulted in the landmark case Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.14  She
brought her claim under the ATS, and, on appeal, the Second Cir-
cuit ruled that torture committed by a state actor against a citizen
9. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (1789) (current version at
28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
11. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
12. Lohengrin is the knight of the swan in a German legend whose identity, too,
long remained unknown: According to the legend, Lohengrin betrothed his bride on
the condition that she shall not ask his identity; when she breached the condition,
Lohengrin revealed his identity and then departed forever. ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA,
INC., 14 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 337 (1948).
13. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878–79 (2d Cir. 1980).
14. 630 F.2d 876.
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constitutes an actionable violation of international law under the
ATS.15
Twenty-five years have passed since Filartiga, and courts hear-
ing ATS cases are still primarily concerned with whether the claims
before them involve issues of international law.  The Second Cir-
cuit, in Kadic v. Karadzic,16 framed the issue as it typically appears in
ATS cases: “The first two requirements are plainly satisfied here,
and the only disputed issue is whether plaintiffs have pleaded viola-
tions of international law.”17  In Filartiga, the Second Circuit stated
that “a threshold question on the jurisdictional issue is whether the
conduct alleged violates the law of nations.”18
The Filartiga court’s use of the word “threshold” is telling of
the importance attached to the determination of whether an al-
leged act violates the law of nations.  The Supreme Court has con-
firmed what twenty-five years of case history established — that not
all violations of the law of nations will qualify as a cause of action
under the ATS.19  In its first major decision on the issue, the Su-
preme Court held:
Whatever the ultimate criteria for accepting a cause of ac-
tion subject to jurisdiction under [the ATS], we are per-
suaded that federal courts should not recognize private
claims under federal common law for violations of any in-
ternational law norm with less definite content and ac-
ceptance among civilized nations than the historical
paradigms familiar when [the ATS] was enacted.20
Thus, the Court has declared that the ATS acts as a vehicle for those
causes of action in international law that are recognized in the com-
mon law, without the need for separate legislatively defined rights
15. Id.
16. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1996).
17. Id.
18. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
19. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 715 (2004).
20. Id. at 732.  The Court’s reading of the history of the enactment of the statute
determines that the statute, when drafted, was meant to apply to a “modest number of
international law violations with a potential for personal liability at the time.” Id. at 724.
This circumspect list included only violation of safe conducts, infringement of the
rights of ambassadors, and piracy. Id. at 715 (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTA-
RIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1769)).
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of action.  How did the Court derive the parameters of the author-
ity granted by this single sentence, with no visible legislative history,
of the Judiciary Act of 1789?
A. The Alien Tort Statute: What Did Congress Intend?
1. The Fledgling Nation Needed a Mechanism to
Redress International Law Violations
According to the Sosa court, there existed a sphere of interna-
tional law in which “rules binding individuals for the benefit of
other individuals overlapped with the norms of state relation-
ships.”21  In other words, this sphere existed where the state-based
and individual-based principles of international law overlapped.  It
was this “hybrid” area that Blackstone was referring to when he
identified three offenses against the law of nations that were recog-
nized by the criminal law of England: (1) violation of safe conducts,
(2) infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and (3) piracy.22  Al-
though these acts were punishable by domestic courts, they could
still have consequences in international relations.  As the Court ex-
plained, “An assault against an ambassador, for example, impinged
upon the sovereignty of the foreign nation and if not adequately
redressed could rise to an issue of war.”23
As the Sosa court noted, the young United States government
was particularly preoccupied with this hybrid area.24  The Continen-
tal Congress, “hamstrung by its inability to ‘cause infractions of trea-
ties, or the law of nations to be punished,’”25 in 1781 called upon
21. Id. at 715.  The court noted that this sphere was in addition to the two discrete
principles, or spheres, of international law already in operation at the time the ATS was
enacted, namely (1) the traditional notion of international law, which is restricted to
relationships between states, and (2) the more “pedestrian” area of judge-made interna-
tional law, which regulates the conduct of individuals, primarily those involved with the
mercantile trade. Id. at 714–715.
22. Id. (citing WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND
68 (1769)).
23. Id. at 715 (citation omitted).
24. See id. at 715–716.
25. Id. at 716 (citing J. MADISON, JOURNAL OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 60
(E. Scott ed. 1893)).
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the state legislatures to provide remedies for essentially the same
three violations enumerated by Blackstone.26  Congress made the
same request again in 1784, after an incident in which the Secretary
of the French Legion, Francis Barbe Marbois, was verbally and phys-
ically assaulted in Philadelphia.27
As a result of this assault, “the French minister plenipotentiary
lodged a formal protest with the Continental Congress”28 and
threatened to leave Pennsylvania unless he was fully satisfied by the
outcome of the dispute.29  In Respublica v. Longchamps,30 the Chief
Justice of Pennsylvania held that an assault on the French Consul
General was “an infraction on the law of nations.  This law, in its full
extent, is part of law of this State, and is to be collected from the
practice of different Nations, and the authority of writers.”31  The
26. As the Court explains, the Continental Congress implored “state legislatures
‘to provide expeditious, exemplary, and adequate punishment’ for ‘the violation of safe
conducts or passports, . . . of hostility against such as are in amity, . . . with the United
States, . . . infractions of the immunities of ambassadors and other public ministers . . .’
[and] ‘infractions of treaties and conventions to which the United States are [sic] a
party.’” Id. (citing 21 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1136–37 (G. Hunt ed.
1912) (all omissions and first alteration in original)).  Connecticut is the only state to
have acted upon this request. Id. (citing FIRST LAWS OF THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT 82,
83 (J. Cushing ed. 1982)).
27. Id. at 716–717; see Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784).
28. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 717 n.11 (citing 27 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS
478 (G. Hunt ed. 1928) (1784)).
29. Id. (citing Letter from Samuel Hardy to Gov. Benjamin Harrison of Virginia
(June 24, 1784), in 7 LETTERS OF MEMBERS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 558, 559 (E.
Burnett ed. 1934)).
30. Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111.
31. Id. at 116.  The court also asserted that law of nations was considered part of
the common law in England: In discussing a similar case heard by the Court of King’s
Bench, the opinion states, “the Court never doubted, that the law of nations formed a
part of the law of England, and that a violation of this general law could be punished by
them . . . .” Id. at 117.  Some debate has occurred as to whether the law of nations was
part of the Colonies, and therefore became the common law of the various States, or
whether the law of nations became part of our federal law when the Nation was formed,
but Banco National de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964), is considered to have
authoritatively resolved this dispute in favor of the federal judiciary.  For more on this
topic, see generally Howard Koh, Is International Law Really State Law?, 111 HARV. L.
REV. 1824 (1998) (being mainly a response to Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith,
Customary International Law as Federal Common Law: A Critique of the Modern Position, 110
HARV. L. REV. 815 (1997), which suggested that federal courts do not have the authority
to integrate customary international law standards into their precedent without prior
political branch action).  It now seems settled that “[f]ederal jurisdiction over cases
involving international law is clear.”  Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir.
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case was to be decided according to the principles of the law of
nations, which formed a part of the municipal law of Penn-
sylvania.32  The court found that the international status of the of-
fense was justified because one who commits an attack on a foreign
minister “not only affronts the Sovereign he represents, but also
hurts the common safety and well being of nations; he is guilty of a
crime against the whole world.”33  The message was clear that, al-
though this case was adjudicated in a municipal state court, the
court’s task was to apply principles of international law.34  The Con-
tinental Congress passed a resolution approving of the state court
proceedings in the case and asked the Secretary of Foreign Affairs
to apologize to Marbois.35  The original draft of the ATS, included
in the first Judiciary Act, read: “[T]he district courts . . . shall also
have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the several States, or
the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien
sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of
the United States.”36
2. The Debate: Pure Jurisdictional Grant or Authority
to Entertain Causes of Action?
In Sosa,37 defendant-petitioner Sosa argued that the ATS pro-
vides only a jurisdictional grant to federal courts and that the stat-
1980).  The Filartiga court stated that, under the Articles of Confederation, the several
states had applied the law of nations as part of their common law, but with the founding
of the “more perfect union” in 1789, the law of nations became of federal concern. Id.
at 877–78.
32. Longchamps, 1 U.S. at 114.
33. Id. at 116.
34. The case was to be “determined on the principles of the law of nations, which
form a part of the municipal law of Pennsylvania.” Id. at 114.
35. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 717 n.11 (2004) (citing 27 JOURNALS OF
THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 503 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds. 1903–37); 28 JOUR-
NALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 314 (Worthington C. Ford et al. eds. 1903–37)).
36. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).  For a good description of the ATS (and a comparison of the
1789 version with the current version), see Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140
(2d Cir. 2003).
37. The underlying facts of Sosa are summarized as follows: Drug Enforcement
Agency (DEA) agents in the United States suspected the respondent, Humberto Alva-
rez-Machain, a physician, of participating in the 1985 torture and murder of DEA agent
Enrique Camarena-Salazar. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 697.  After a federal grand jury in Califor-
nia indicted Alvarez-Machain, negotiations between the DEA and the Mexican govern-
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ute provides no authority for courts to recognize causes of action
without independent Congressional action.38  Respondent Alvarez-
Machain argued that the statute grants courts the authority to cre-
ate new causes of action for torts in violation of international law.39
The Supreme Court found that there was no legislative history on
the question: “There is no record of congressional discussion about
private actions that might be subject to the jurisdictional provision,
or about any need for further legislation to create private remedies;
there is no record even of debate on the section.”40  Nevertheless,
the Court, based on its reading of history, declared that
“[a]lthough we agree the statute is in terms only jurisdictional, we
think that at the time of enactment the jurisdiction enabled federal
courts to hear claims in a very limited category defined by the law of
nations and recognized at common law.”41
This debate was not new.  In Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic,
which involved a claim under the ATS arising from a terrorist attack
on a passenger bus in Israel, three judges on the Court of Appeals
for the District of Columbia Circuit wrote three separate concur-
ring opinions.42  The Tel-Oren court dismissed the claim, but each
judge on the panel expressed different reasons for so doing.  In his
concurrence, Judge Edwards argued that the ATS provides both a
right of action and a forum.43  He reasoned that to deny that a
cause of action is implied in the statute would be to nullify the law
of nations portion of the ATS, since it “relegates decisions on such
ment for extradition of Alvarez-Machain to the United States failed. Id. at 698.  The
DEA then hired a group of Mexican nationals to seize Alvarez-Machain and bring him
to the United States for arrest and trial. Id.  Sosa was one of the group of Mexican
nationals that abducted Alvarez-Machain to the United States. Id.  Alvarez-Machain first
moved to dismiss the indictment as “outrageous government conduct.” Id.  The Ninth
Circuit granted the motion, but the Supreme Court reversed. Id.  Alvarez-Machain
then brought a civil suit against Sosa and others under the Federal Tort Claims Act, and
against Sosa alone under the ATS, claiming that his arbitrary arrest and detention con-
stituted a tort in violation of the law of nations. Id. at 698–99.
38. Id. at 712.
39. Id. at 713.
40. Id. at 718.
41. Id. at 712.
42. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
43. Id. at 777 (Edwards, J., concurring).
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questions to the states themselves . . . .”44  Edwards distinguished
the ATS from Section 1331, which is a purely jurisdictional grant
and requires that an action “arise under” the laws of the United
States.45  In contrast, according to Edwards’s opinion, the ATS
“only mandates a ‘violation of the law of nations’ in order to create
a cause of action.  The language of the statute is explicit on this
issue: by its express terms, nothing more than a violation of the law
of nations is required to invoke [the ATS].”46  Nevertheless, Ed-
wards opined that the acts of torture committed by the PLO, hei-
nous as they were, were not actionable under the ATS because
torture could not be considered a violation of the law of nations
when committed by a non-state party.47
Judge Bork, in a separate concurrence, maintained that the
ATS, like Section 1331, is a purely jurisdictional grant, and that Sep-
aration of Powers principles prevent courts from recognizing causes
of action not otherwise specifically granted by Congress.48  Bork
agreed with the district court that the ATS must be interpreted nar-
rowly to require a private right of action in international law,49 and
he accepted the well-established premise that international law is
part of the common law of the United States.50  He contended,
however, that this merely means that international law is not statu-
tory or constitutional: According to Bork, international law may be
applied in municipal courts, but does not provide a “right to ask for
judicial relief.”51  Additionally, Bork reasoned, a broad reading of
the ATS — one that would provide a right of action in international
law — is not advisable: “[C]onsiderations of separation of powers
. . . provide ample reason for refusing to take steps that would
plunge federal courts into the foreign affairs of the United
44. Id. at 778.
45. 28 U.S. § 1331 (2000) (stating in full, “The district courts shall have original
jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
United States.”).
46. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 779 (Edwards, J., concurring).
47. Id. at 791–796.
48. Id. at 799 (Bork, J., concurring).
49. See id. at 800.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 811.
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States.”52  He reasoned that such involvement by the courts would
cause conflicts between the United States and other nations and
pointed out that history shows that the ATS was enacted to open
federal courts to aliens in order to avoid conflicts.53
Judge Robb, in the third concurring opinion, thought that the
case should be decided based on the political question doctrine,54
and he criticized the use of the ATS in Filartiga because he thought
that employing the statute to further human rights goals “may very
well rebound to the decisive disadvantage of the nation.  A plain-
tiff’s individual victory, if it entails embarrassing disclosures of this
country’s approach to the control of the terrorist phenomenon,
may in fact be the collective’s defeat.”55
In the aftermath of Tel-Oren, business groups and the United
States government have tended to adopt the views of both Judges
Bork and Robb and have opposed the use of the statute for any
purpose, absent independent Congressional action.56  Human
rights groups, in contrast, have sided with a reading of the statute
that is, perhaps, even broader than the one advanced by Judge Ed-
wards.57  The Supreme Court’s reading of the statute in Sosa, how-
ever, produced a result more reminiscent of Edwards’s.  The Court
found that “the first Congress did not pass the ATS as a jurisdic-
tional convenience to be placed on the shelf for use by a future
Congress or state legislature that might, some day, authorize the
52. Id.
53. Id. at 812.
54. Id. at 823 (Robb, J., concurring).
55. Id. at 827 n.5.
56. See, e.g., Thomas Niles, The Very Long Arm of American Law, FINANCIAL TIMES,
Nov. 6, 2002, at 15; John E. Howard, Op-Ed., The Alien Tort Claims Act: Is Our Litigation-
Run-Amok Going Global?, U.S. CHAMBER OF COMMERCE, Oct. 2002, available at U.S. Cham-
ber of Commerce, http://www.uschamber.com/press/opeds/0210howarditigation.htm
(last visited Jan. 2, 2006).  The United States government has submitted an appellate
brief in support of the defendant in Sosa. See Brief for the U.S. as Respondent Support-
ing Petitioner, Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339), 2004 WL
182581.
57. See, e.g., HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEFEND THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT (2003),
http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/atca (last visited Jan. 2, 2006); EARTH RIGHTS INTERNA-
TIONAL, DEFENDING THE ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ACT (2004), http://www.earthrights.org/
atca/index.shtml (last visited Jan. 2, 2006).
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creation of causes of action . . . .”58  The Court saw the ATS as hav-
ing an immediate, but not broad, effect: “Congress intended the
ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions al-
leging violations of the law of nations.”59  Furthermore, the Court
saw no evidence that Congress had any other violations in mind
than the three enumerated by Blackstone — (1) violations of safe
conducts, (2) infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and (3)
piracy.60  Neither did the Court find reason to conclude that any
“development in the two centuries from the enactment of [the
ATS] to the birth of the modern line of cases . . . has categorically
precluded federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of
nations . . . .”61  Thus, just as the common law recognized certain
violations of international law when the statute was enacted in 1789,
today international law is part of the common law of the United
States.
The Court nevertheless perceived several reasons for courts to
approach the question with caution: (1) “the prevailing conception
of the common law has changed since 1790 in a way that counsels
restraint in judicially applying internationally generated norms;”62
(2) the post-Erie re-thinking of the role of federal courts in creating
common law;63 (3) “a decision to create a private right of action is
one better left to legislative judgment in the great majority of
cases;”64 (4) the potential collateral consequences of creating a pri-
vate right of action in international law, and the potential foreign
relations implications of doing so;65 and (5) no Congressional man-
58. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 719.  The Court explained that “[t]he anxieties of the precon-
stitutional period cannot be ignored easily enough to think that the statute was not
meant to have a practical effect.” Id.  Interestingly, the most likely draftsman was Oliver
Ellsworth, who was a member of the Connecticut legislature when it honored Con-
gress’s request to create remedies for violations of the law of nations.  Id. (citing gener-
ally W. BROWN, THE LIFE OF OLIVER ELLSWORTH (1905)).
59. Id. at 720.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 724–25.
62. Id. at 725.
63. Id. at 726 (citing Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and
describing Erie as “the watershed in which we denied the existence of any federal ‘gen-
eral’ common law”).
64. Id. at 727.
65. Id. at 727–28 (stating that “[i]t is one thing for American courts to enforce
constitutional limits on our own State and Federal Governments’ power, but quite an-
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date exists for courts to “seek out and define new and debatable
violations of the law of nations, and modern indications of congres-
sional understanding of the judicial role in the field have not af-
firmatively encouraged greater judicial creativity.”66
Ultimately, Sosa held that when the ATS was enacted in 1789,
the common law, as it then existed, would provide a limited num-
ber of causes of action.67  Thus, Sosa retained the common law view
of 1789: Under the ATS today, customary international law will pro-
vide only a limited number of causes of action.  The mere exis-
tence, according to this reasoning, of an international customary
norm does not necessarily give rise to a cause of action for its viola-
tion under the ATS.  The Court explained that in 1789, as today,
“some, but few, torts in violation of the law of nations were under-
stood to be within the common law.”68  Thus, “courts should re-
quire any claim based on the present-day law of nations to rest on a
norm of international character accepted by the civilized world and
defined with a specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-
century paradigms we have recognized.”69  Specifically, causes of ac-
tion will be recognized today under the ATS if they are defined in
international law with the same level of specificity and universal ac-
other to consider suits under rules that would go so far as to claim a limit on the power
of a foreign government over their own citizens . . . .”).  This list was apparently not
meant to be exhaustive.  The Court also mentioned an argument made in an amicus
brief that exhaustion of municipal remedies and attempts to bring claims in interna-
tional tribunals should be prerequisites to ATS claims. Id. at 732 n.20.  The Court also
stated “[a]nother possible limitation . . . is a policy of case-specific deference to the
political branches.” Id. at 733 n.21.  The example cited to was the South African gov-
ernment’s position on the case In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538
(S.D.N.Y. 2004); the South African government stated that these types of cases interfere
with the policy of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which “‘deliberately
avoided a “victor’s justice” approach to the crimes of apartheid and chose instead one
based on confession and absolution, informed by the principles of reconciliation, re-
construction, reparation and goodwill.’” Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 (quoting Declaration of
Penuell Mpapa Maduna, Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development, Republic
of South Africa (July 11, 2003), reprinted in Brief of the Government of Commonwealth
of Australia et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner app. b, at 7a).  Given the
position of the South African government, there is a strong argument that, in some
situations, federal courts should defer to the Executive Branch’s judgment on the mat-
ter. Id.
66. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 728.
67. Id. at 712.
68. Id. at 720.
69. Id. at 749.
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ceptance as violations of safe conduct, infringement of rights of am-
bassadors, and piracy were defined in 1789.
B. Much of the ATS Precedent Remains Intact
The Sosa court said much about the lower courts’ handling of
previous ATS cases when it declared that “[t]his limit upon judicial
recognition is generally consistent with the reasoning of many of
the courts and judges who faced the issue before it reached this
Court.”70  The Court pointed to examples in which courts had ap-
plied stringent standards when recognizing rights of action in inter-
national law.  The examples include Filartiga’s characterization of
the torturer as “ ‘like the pirate and slave trader before him — hostis
humani generis, an enemy of all mankind,’”71 and Judge Edwards’s
suggestion in Tel-Oren that ATS jurisdiction reaches “‘a handful of
heinous actions — each of which violates definable, universal and
obligatory norms.’”72  The Sosa court cited with approval the stan-
dard relied upon by the Ninth Circuit: “ ‘Actionable violations of
international law must be of a norm that is specific, universal, and
obligatory.’”73  The court also referred to United States v. Smith,74 a
70. Id. at 732.  Although the Court did not discuss the inverse, the result of the
application of reasoning congruous with Sosa is that courts have consistently dismissed
ATS cases that did not rest upon clearly defined violations of international law. See, e.g.,
Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 160 (holding that “the asserted ‘right to
life’ and ‘right to health’ are insufficiently definite to constitute rules of customary in-
ternational law.  As noted above, in order to state a claim under the [ATS], we have
required that a plaintiff allege a violation of a ‘clear and unambiguous’ rule of custom-
ary international law.”). See also Beanal v. Freeport-McMoran, 197 F.3d 161, 167 (5th
Cir. 1999) (stating that customary international law cannot be established by reference
to “abstract rights and liberties devoid of articulable or discernable standards and regu-
lations”).  Additionally, the Alvarez-Machain v. United States case, which Sosa reversed,
had dismissed the cross-border aspect of the claim.  331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d
sub nom. Sosa, 542 U.S. 692.  Regarding the cross-border abduction claim, the Alvarez-
Machain court stated: “Because a human rights norm recognizing an individual’s right
to be free from transborder abductions has not reached a status of international accord
sufficient to render it ‘obligatory’ or ‘universal,’ it cannot qualify as an actionable norm
under the [ATS].  This is a case where aspiration has not yet ripened into obligation.”
Id. at 620.
71. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (quoting Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir.
1980)).
72. Id. (quoting Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 781 (D.C. Cir.
1984)).
73. Id. (quoting In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litigation, 25 F.3d 1467,
1475 (9th Cir. 1994)).
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seventeenth-century case, as an example of a case “illustrating the
specificity with which the law of nations defined piracy.”75  The
Smith court wrote:
There is scarcely a writer on the law of nations, who does
not allude to piracy as a crime of a settled and determi-
nate nature; and whatever may be the diversity of defini-
tions, in other respects, all writers concur, in holding, that
robbery, or forcible depredations upon the sea, animo
furandi, is piracy. The same doctrine is held by all the
great writers on maritime law, in terms that admit of no
reasonable doubt. The common law, too, recogni[z]es
and punishes piracy as an offence, not against its own mu-
nicipal code, but as an offence against the law of nations,
(which is part of the common law,) [sic] as an offence
against the universal law of society, a pirate being deemed
an enemy of the human race.76
The Sosa court’s citing these examples implies that federal courts
had consistently applied its hitherto unarticulated rule.
The central inquiry in ATS cases typically must begin with the
question whether the subject claims are violations of a customary
international norm.77  Customary international law has been de-
fined as “result[ing] from a general and consistent practice of states
followed by them from a sense of legal obligation.”78  Two compo-
nents are apparent in this modern definition of customary interna-
tional law: (1) It results from a general and consistent practice of
states, and (2) it is followed by them from a sense of legal obliga-
tion.  As the examples cited by the Sosa Court indicate, however,
74. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
75. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 732 (citing Smith, 18 U.S. 153).
76. Smith, 18 U.S. at 162.
77. See, e.g., Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 880 (2d Cir. 1980) (stating that “a
threshold question on the jurisdictional issue is whether the conduct alleged violates
the law of nations”); see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1996) (stating
that “[t]he first two requirements are plainly satisfied here, and the only disputed issue
is whether plaintiffs have pleaded violations of international law”).
78. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (2) (1987).  In the context of prize law, The Paquete Habana court described the
process: “By an ancient usage among civilized nations, beginning centuries ago, and
gradually ripening into a rule of international law, coastal fishing vessels . . . have been
recognized as exempt . . . from capture as prize of war.”  The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677, 688 (1900).
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federal courts adjudicating claims under the ATS have tended to
hold the bar higher than this modern definition of what constitutes
a customary binding norm of international law.79
While the first prong of the test for a customary binding norm
requires that a practice be “general and consistent,” rather than
universal, federal courts adjudicating ATS claims have consistently,
although not unanimously, required universality.  The Filartiga
court referred to a universal standard in its inquiry as to whether
official torture constitutes an actionable violation of international
law:
In light of the universal condemnation of torture in nu-
merous international agreements, and the renunciation
of torture as an instrument of official policy by virtually all
of the nations of the world (in principle if not in prac-
tice), we find that an act of torture committed by a state
official against one held in detention violates established
norms of the international law of human rights, and
hence the law of nations.80
Some scholars have argued that the Filartiga court actually required
no more than a showing of customary international law in order to
adjudicate a claim under the ATS.81  In contrast to the above lan-
guage, the court stated: “Having examined the sources from which
customary international law is derived — the usage of nations, judi-
cial opinions and the works of jurists — we conclude that official
torture is now prohibited by the law of nations.”82  The court, how-
ever, followed by stating that “[t]he prohibition is clear and unam-
biguous.”83  Moreover, the frequency with which the Filartiga court
79. Exceptions exist. See, e.g., Abebe-Jira v. Negewo, 72 F.3d. 844, 847 (11th Cir.
1996) (“We read the statute as requiring no more than an allegation of a violation of
the law of nations in order to invoke [the ATS].”).
80. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
81. See, e.g., William S. Dodge, Which Torts in Violation of the Law of Nations?, 24
HASTINGS INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 351, 352 (2001); see also Luciana Reali, Alvarez-Machain
v. United States: How Should the Ninth Circuit Determine Which Torts Are Actionable Under the
Alien Tort Statute?, 17 N.Y. INT’L L. REV. 51, 62 (2004).  Reali argues that this is the
proper standard and the one actually employed by the Filartiga court, and that this
standard is broader than the tripartite “specific, universal and obligatory” test that most
post-Filartiga courts have employed. Id. at 61–62.
82. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 884 (citation omitted).
83. Id.
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referred to the universal assent of the prohibition on torture belies
the argument.  For example, the court stated that “[t]urning to the
act of torture, we have little difficulty discerning its universal renun-
ciation in the modern usage and practice of nations.”84  The Filar-
tiga court further observed that “[t]he requirement that a rule
command the ‘general assent of civilized nations’ to become bind-
ing upon them all is a stringent one.  Were this not so, the courts of
one nation might feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon
others, in the name of applying international law.”85  Although the
court referred to the “general assent” of nations, the actual stan-
dard applied was universality.
As the Sosa court noted, subsequent to Filartiga many courts
used a standard that required that the tort be in violation of a norm
that is “ ‘universal, definable, and obligatory.’”86  Although this
standard has been attributed to the Filartiga court, it is instead
traceable to a subsequent law review article that attempted to limit
Filartiga’s scope.87  In Tel-Oren, the D.C. Circuit referred both to this
standard and to the authors of the law review article when it ex-
pressed in dicta that certain “heinous actions” will be considered
violations of international law even if committed by private actors.88
This dicta was later adopted as rule of law by Kadic.89
The Sosa case itself is instructive (although Sosa emphasized
the concept of specificity perhaps more than universality): In Sosa,
the Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit, which had ruled
84. Id. at 883.
85. Id. at 881.
86. Dodge, supra note 81, at 353 (quoting Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. R
1531, 1540 (N.D. Cal. 1987)); see also Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th
Cir. 1994) (“Actionable violations of international law must be of a norm that is specific,
universal, and obligatory.”); Beanal v. Freeport-McMoRan, Inc., 969 F. Supp. 362, 370
(E.D. La. 1997) (“To be recognized as an international tort under [the ATS], the al-
leged violation must be definable, obligatory [rather than hortatory], and universally
condemned.”).
87. Dodge, supra note 81, at 354–55 (quoting Jeffrey M. Blum & Ralph G. Stein- R
hardt, Federal Jurisdiction over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien Tort Statute after
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT’L L.J. 53 (1981)). See also Reali, supra note 81, at R
62.
88. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Tel Oren was
dismissed, however, because the court ultimately decided that a politically motivated
terrorist attack was not a violation of international law, regardless of how reprehensible
it may be considered under our domestic norms. Id.
89. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
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that there was an international prohibition against arbitrary arrest
and detention.90  The Ninth Circuit had applied the “specific, uni-
versal, and obligatory” test, which it had adopted in In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litigation.91  The arbitrary arrest and deten-
tion claim met the Alvarez-Machain v. United States court’s standard:
The Ninth Circuit had observed that specific prohibitions of acts of
arbitrary arrest and detention are “codified in every major compre-
hensive human rights instrument and [are] reflected in at least 119
national constitutions.”92  The Ninth Circuit noted that the United
Nations Universal Declaration on Human Rights and the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights both explicitly pro-
hibit arbitrary arrest and detention.93  However, the Supreme Court
disagreed, pointing out that neither of these instruments imposes
legal obligations on its own authority.94  In its attempt to show that
prohibition of arbitrary arrest and detention has been established
as a customary norm, the Ninth Circuit had also cited the Restate-
ment (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
(“Restatement of Foreign Relations Law”), which enumerates arbi-
trary arrest and detention as a prohibited offense.95  The Supreme
Court found that the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law actually
undermined the support for the proposition that a broad prohibi-
tion has been established in international law against arbitrary ar-
rest and detention, since the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law
refers to “‘prolonged arbitrary detention’”96 as opposed to mere “ar-
bitrary” detention.97  Additionally, the Ninth Circuit relied upon the
fact that consensus exists among many nations in recognizing a pro-
90. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub nom.
Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
91. In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (1995).  The In
re Marcos court cited Filartiga as a source for the “specific, universal, and obligatory”
standard, although the test did not originate in Filartiga. Id.
92. Alvarez-Machain, 331, F.3d at 620.
93. Id. at 620–621.
94. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 735.  It should be noted that the singular fact that these in-
struments do not impose legal obligations was not sufficient to defeat the status of arbi-
trary arrest and detention as prohibited by customary norm.
95. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.3d at 621.
96. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 737 (quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELA-
TIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 702 (1987) (emphasis added)).
97. Id. (emphasis added).
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hibition against arbitrary detention.98  The Supreme Court found
that although such consensus exists, it is “at a high level of general-
ity”99 and therefore lacks the required degree of specificity.
The second component of customary international law is that a
practice be “followed . . . from a sense of legal obligation.”100  This
opinion juris requirement has presented more difficulty.  States
often follow practices initially out of a sense of moral obligation or
courtesy, but “it is often difficult to determine when that transforma-
tion into law has taken place.”101  In adjudicating ATS claims,
courts have relied on the distinction between norms that meet this
definition and norms that are “adopted for moral or political rea-
sons, but not out of a sense of legal obligation”102 and therefore “do
not give rise to rules of customary international law.”103  The Sec-
ond Circuit, in Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp., described the
standard as a violation of “those rules that States universally abide
by, or accede to, out of a sense of legal obligation and mutual con-
cern.”104  The Flores court stressed the requirement that the norm
be a legal obligation and not one that is acceded to merely for
moral or political reasons; also, the norm must be sufficiently defi-
nite and not so general as to be simply “aspirational.”105  The Ninth
Circuit made a similar distinction in Alvarez-Machain when it found
that cross-border abduction did not meet the standard for a viola-
tion of international law under the ATS.106  The court explained:
Because a human rights norm recognizing an individual’s
right to be free from transborder abductions has not
reached a status of international accord sufficient to
render it “obligatory” or “universal,” it cannot qualify as
98. Alvarez-Machain, 331 F.2d at 621.
99. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 736 n.27.
100. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (2) (1987).
101. Id. at § 102 cmt. c. (emphasis added).
102. Flores v. S. Peru Copper Corp., 343 F.3d 140, 154 (2d Cir. 2003).
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 331 F.3d 604, 620 (9th Cir. 2003), rev’d sub
nom. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004).
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an actionable norm under the [ATS].  This is a case
where aspiration has not yet ripened into obligation.107
Here the court made an emphatic distinction between broad policy
declarations and specific prohibitions.
Another method used by courts to determine international law
violations under the ATS is the distinction between the several con-
cerns that states may have in common and the truly mutual con-
cerns of nations.  In its inquiry as to whether official torture violates
the law of nations, Filartiga relied on this distinction.108  This analy-
sis actually predates the modern ATS cases.  In the Brig Malek Adhel
v. United States case,109 the Court illustrated this distinction in ex-
plaining why piracy is a violation of the law of nations while robbery
is not: “A pirate is deemed, and properly deemed, hostis humani
generis.  But why is he so deemed?  Because he commits hostilities
upon the subjects and property of any or all nations, without any
regard to right or duty, or any pretence of public authority.”110
Similarly, in 1861, U.S. District Court Judge Peleg Sprague stated
that “[p]irates are highwaymen of the sea, and all civilized nations
have a common interest, and are under a moral obligation, to ar-
rest and suppress them . . . .”111
More recently, in IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., which addressed the appli-
cation of the ATS to fraud allegations in a multinational context,
the court noted that the mere fact that every nation’s municipal law
may prohibit theft does not incorporate “the Eighth Command-
ment ‘Thou Shalt not steal’ [into] the law of nations.”112  The Filar-
tiga court observed that “[i]t is only where the nations of the world
have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely sev-
eral, concern, by means of express international accords, that a
107. Id.
108. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (“It is only where
the nations of the world have demonstrated that the wrong is of mutual, and not merely
several, concern, by means of express international accords, that a wrong generally rec-
ognized becomes an international law violation within the meaning of the statute.”).
109. Brig Malek Adhel v. United States, 43 U.S. (2 How.) 210 (1844).
110. Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
111. Charge to Grand Jury — Treason and Piracy, 30 F. Cas. 1049 (C.C. D. Mass.
1861) (No. 18,277).
112. IIT v. Vencap Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975).
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wrong generally recognized becomes an international law violation
within the meaning of the [ATS].”113
The Sosa court did not make an explicit pronouncement as to
the proper sources of international law, so it is worthwhile to ex-
amine the sources used by the cases that Sosa cites with approval —
Filartiga, which relied on the Smith114 and The Paquete Habana115
cases.116  In defining the sources for international law, the Smith
court stated that “[w]hat the law of nations on this subject is, may
be ascertained by consulting the works of jurists, writing professedly
on public law; or by the general usage and practice of nations; or by
judicial decisions recognising [sic] and enforcing that law.”117
Echoing the language in Smith, the Paquete Habana court stated as
the sources of authority for international law “the customs and us-
ages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, . . . the works of
jurists and commentators, who . . . have made themselves peculiarly
well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat.”118 Filartiga
not only looked to the Smith and Paquete Habana courts’ scholarly
and jurisprudential focus and to the writings of modern day inter-
national law scholars,119 but also had the benefit of modern inter-
national human rights instruments, including (1) the Statute of the
International Court of Justice (ICJ),120 (2) the United Nations
Charter,121 and (3) the Universal Declaration on Human Rights.122
The Filartiga court looked to the Statute of the International Court
113. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 888 (2d Cir. 1980) (citing IIT, 519 F.2d at 1015).
114. United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820).
115. The Paquette Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
116. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880–81.
117. Smith, 18 U.S. at 160–61.
118. Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
119. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 879 n.4 (quoting Richard Falk, the Albert G. Milbank
Professor of International Law and Practice at Princeton University, who states, “it is
now beyond reasonable doubt that torture of a person held in detention that results in
severe harm or death is a violation of the law of nations,” and citing Thomas Franck,
professor of international law at New York University and director of the New York
University Center for International Studies, who claims “that torture has now been re-
jected by virtually all nations, although it was once commonly used to extract confes-
sions” (no citations in original)).
120. Id. at 881.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 882.  There are several references in the Filartiga opinion that indicate
the validity of reliance on modern sources of authority: The opinion mentions that
even the district court, which had dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds, had
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of Justice (ICJ Statute),123 to which the United States and all mem-
bers of the United Nations are parties, to determine the proper
sources for international law.124  Article 38 of the ICJ Statute lists
the authorities on which the ICJ relies:
The [ICJ], whose function is to decide in accordance with
international law such disputes as are submitted to it,
shall apply:
a) international conventions, whether general or
particular, establishing rules expressly recognized
by the contesting states;
b) international custom, as evidence of a general
practice accepted as law;
c) the general principles of law recognized by civi-
lized nations;
d) . . . judicial decisions and the teachings of the
most highly qualified publicists of the various na-
tions, as subsidiary means for the determination of
rules of law.125
recognized the emerging norm of recognizing official torture as a violation of interna-
tional law. Id. at 880.
123. Drafted in 1946 at the San Francisco Conference, the Statute reflects the prin-
ciples of Chapter XIV of the United Nations Charter.  “Whilst [the statute] forms an
integral part of the Charter, it is not incorporated into it, but is simply annexed.”  The
International Court of Justice History Page, http://www.icj-cij.org (follow “Welcome to
ICJ-CIJ.ORG” hyperlink; then follow “General Information” hyperlink; then follow “A
guide to the history, composition, jurisdiction, procedure and decisions of the Court”
hyperlink; then follow “History” hyperlink) (last visited Jan. 5, 2006).
124. Filartiga, 630 F.3d at 881.
125. Statute of the International Court of Justice art. 38, June 26, 1945, available at
http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/ibasicdocuments/ibasictext/ibasicstatute.htm (emphasis
added).  The Statute clearly states that the judicial decisions and scholarly works are
“subsidiary means” for establishing the rule of law. Id. Filartiga did not elaborate on
the distinction between primary and secondary sources of international law; recent case
law, however, has focused more strictly on the distinction between primary and secon-
dary sources of international law and has emphasized that scholarly works and judicial
opinions fall squarely in the secondary category.  For example, the United States v. Yousef
court recently found that “we look primarily to the formal lawmaking and official ac-
tions of States and only secondarily to the works of scholars as evidence of the estab-
lished practice of States.”  327 F.3d 56, 103 (2d Cir. 2003).  And the Flores v. Southern
Peru Copper Corp. court followed the Yousef reasoning and refused to consider judicial
decisions as primary sources of customary international law.  343 F.3d 140 (2d  Cir.
2003).  This approach was followed by Professor Clive Parry of Cambridge University,
on whom the Yousef court also relied: Professor Parry observed that “the writings of
publicists are an acceptable additional source to shed light on a particular question of
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Having stated that federal courts have generally adhered to strict
standards for recognizing claims under the ATS, it is not surprising
that the Sosa court, referring to the role of the federal judiciary in
the context of the ATS, said that “no development in the two centu-
ries from the enactment of [the ATS] to the birth of the modern
line of cases beginning with Filartiga . . . has categorically precluded
federal courts from recognizing a claim under the law of nations as
an element of common law . . . .”126  Notably, Erie Railroad Co. v.
Tompkins, which circumscribed the concept of a federal common
law,127 did little to change the role of federal courts with regard to
international law: “International disputes implicating . . . our rela-
tions with foreign nations are one of the ‘narrow areas’ in which
‘federal common law’ continues to exist.”128  The Court affirmed
that “[f]or two centuries we have affirmed that the domestic law of
the United States recognizes the law of nations.”129  Having estab-
lished that federal courts have authority to recognize certain causes
of action under the ATS, Sosa leaves open the question whether any
complicity-based causes of action meet the standard for
recognition.
international law only when ‘recourse must also be had’ beyond the ‘opinions,’ ‘deci-
sions,’ and ‘acts’ of States, and only then to a lesser degree than to more authoritative
evidence, such as the State’s own ‘declarations,’ laws,’ and ‘instructions’ to its agents.”
Yousef, 327 F.3d at 94 (citation omitted).  In contrast, the Filartiga court noted that the
court in United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153 (1820), derived its certainty about
the universal consensus on the prohibition against piracy from the scholarly works of
Grotius, Bochard, “and other commentators.” Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880.
126. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724–25 (2004) (citation omitted).
127. Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that the concept
of a general federal common law is no longer considered valid).
128. Texas Indus., Inc. v. Radcliff Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 641 (1981).  The
Sosa court quotes Texas Indus., Sosa, 542 U.S. at 730, and Justice Scalia, in his concur-
ring opinion, notes that the ATS was enacted before Erie, when the idea of a general
federal common law was accepted; the ATS was enacted based on an understanding
that “rested upon a notion of general common law that has been repudiated by Erie.”
Id. at 744 (Scalia, J., concurring).  Scalia argues that because general federal common
law no longer exists, federal courts no longer have authority to apply the law of nations
as part of federal common law. Id. at 744–45.
129. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729.
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III. THE COURTS ARE WITHOUT A STANDARD FOR COMPLICITY
UNDER THE ATS
There currently is no Sosa-approved standard under which to
adjudicate whether complicity in acts that constitute violations of
international law under the ATS (and under Sosa) is itself actiona-
ble under the ATS.  This is hardly surprising.  After all, when the
drafters of the First Judiciary Act of 1789 perceived the need to
grant the federal courts jurisdiction to hear claims by aliens of viola-
tions of international law,130 they likely did not foresee the events
that would occur more than two hundred years later surrounding
the Yadana natural gas pipeline project and a group of villagers
from Myanmar’s Tenasserim region.  This pipeline project was run
by Unocal Corporation (“Unocal Corp.”), a California oil and natu-
ral gas exploration company,131 in partnership with the govern-
ment of Myanmar and led to the Doe v. Unocal case.132  The ATS was
the basis for claims by the villagers that the Myanmar government,
through the actions of its military officers, violated the law of na-
tions by committing human rights abuses including forced labor,
rape, torture, and murder in support of the pipeline project; more-
over, the ATS was used as the basis for liability against not only the
government but also Unocal Corp.: the plaintiffs claimed that Uno-
cal Corp. should be held liable for its alleged supporting role in the
acts.133
It is also likely that the drafters of the ATS did not envision a
group of South African citizens who suffered for fifty years under
apartheid.  The South African citizens, in In re South African
Apartheid Litigation,134 alleged that various companies that invested
130. The original version of what is now referred to as the Alien Tort Statute read:
“The district courts . . . shall also have cognizance, concurrent with the courts of the
several States, or the circuit courts, as the case may be, of all causes where an alien sues
for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or treaty of the United States.”  Judiciary
Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, 76–77 (current version at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000)).
131. See Unocal Corporation Myanmar Project Page, http://www.unocal.com/my-
anmar/index.htm (last visited Jan. 5, 2006).
132. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh’g granted, 395 F.3d
978 (9th Cir. 2003).
133. Id. at 936-37.
134. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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in the country should be held liable for their business activities and
investments during the rule of the apartheid regime.135
The Unocal plaintiffs alleged that Unocal Corp. provided mate-
rial, logistical, and monetary support to the military officers, and
that liability could be assessed against the corporation for its al-
leged supporting role.136  The underlying alleged actions of the
military — facilitating forced labor and committing extrajudicial
killing, rape, and torture — were found to be actionable as viola-
tions of international law under the ATS.137  The Ninth Circuit ini-
tially also held that Unocal Corp. could be brought to trial under
the ATS for its supporting role in the actions of the military, and
adopted the international law-based aiding and abetting stan-
dard.138  Subsequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated the decision by
the three-judge panel and decided to rehear the case en banc139 to
decide whether to assess the secondary liability, if any, of Unocal
Corp. under the aiding and abetting standard or under federal
common law standards that were suggested by the concurring opin-
ion.  Both the Ninth Circuit’s original decision and the vacatur oc-
curred before Sosa.  No resolution will be forthcoming under the
Sosa regime, however: In December of 2004 it was announced that
the parties had entered into settlement negotiations,140 and in
March of 2005 the case settled on undisclosed terms.141
The South African plaintiffs faced a different result.  The dis-
trict court dismissed the case based upon the plaintiffs’ failure to
state a claim in international law; as a result, the court lacked juris-
diction under the ATS, which requires by its terms that claims al-
lege international law violations: Although the court accepted that
the alleged underlying acts of the South African government consti-
135. Id.
136. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 936–37.
137. Id. at 945.  Early cases used the terms “Alien Tort Claims Act” or “ATCA,” and
much of the commentary on the topic uses these terms.  Considering that Sosa is the
first major treatment of the statute by the Supreme Court, the new moniker, Alien Tort
Statute or ATS, will likely stick.
138. Id. at 947–49.
139. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
140. E.g., Unocal Settles Rights Suit in Myanmar, NEW YORK TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at
C6; Lisa Girion, Unocal to Settle Rights Claims, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 14, 2004, at A1.
141. E.g., Mark Lifsher, Unocal Settles Human Rights Suit Over Alleged Abuses at My-
anmar Pipeline, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2005, at C1.
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tuted violations of international law,142 the court nevertheless re-
jected all of the plaintiffs’ secondary liability theories, including
aiding and abetting.143
What is lacking, then, is a clear standard for adjudicating ques-
tions of complicity in violations of international law under the ATS.
The inquiry into the proper standard must begin with the question
of whether the proposed standard must be sought under interna-
tional law or under U.S. domestic law.  The Unocal court initially
decided that the potential liability of Unocal Corp. for its alleged
supporting role in the actions of the Myanmar military should be
assessed under an international aiding and abetting standard,
which the court found was an established international law rule.144
The court in In re Apartheid Litigation — in contrast to Unocal, in
which the court had no Supreme Court guidance — held that aid-
ing and abetting an international law violation was not “itself an
international law violation that is universally accepted as a legal ob-
ligation.”145  The court concluded that aiding and abetting was not
142. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (“Plain-
tiffs have alleged a veritable cornucopia of international law violations, including forced
labor, genocide, torture, sexual assault, unlawful detention, extrajudicial killings, war
crimes, and racial discrimination.”).  The opinion also notes that the United Nations
General Assembly “deemed apartheid ‘a crime against humanity.’” Id. at 545.
143. Id. at 548 (“Tested by these [Sosa] precepts, it is clear that plaintiffs’ causes of
action under the [ATS] must be dismissed.”).  The court explained that “[a]lthough it
is clear that the actions of the apartheid regime were repugnant, and that the decisions
of the defendants to do business with that regime may have been morally suspect or
‘embarrassing,’ it is this Court’s job to apply the law and not some normative or moral
ideal.” Id. at 548 (citation omitted).
144. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 948–49.  The court relied mainly on the factors listed in
the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969); these factors include the
needs of the international law system, the “relevant policies of the forum,” and consid-
erations of notice, uniformity, and predictability. Id. at 968 n.6.  The court also consid-
ered that since the purpose of the statute is to provide tort remedies for violations of
international law, “this goal is furthered by the application of international law.” Id. at
949.  The court applied the aiding and abetting standard and found that issues of fact
existed as to whether Unocal Corp.’s actions met this standard. Id. at 953. See also Wiwa
v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002) (holding that
Royal Dutch Petroleum could be held liable for the actions of the Nigerian government
based on the “joint action” test developed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 state action jurispru-
dence); Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d 289
(S.D.N.Y. 2003) (finding defendant Talisman incorrect in asserting that aiding and
abetting and complicity theories are not actionable under the ATS).
145. In re Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 549.
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defined in international law with the clarity or specificity required
by Sosa.146 Little has changed since 1984, when Judge Edwards de-
clared in Tel-Oren:
This case deals with an area of the law that cries out for
clarification by the Supreme Court.  We confront at every
turn broad and novel questions about the definition and
application of the “law of nations.”  As is obvious from the
laborious efforts of opinion writing, the questions posed
defy easy answers.147
Thus, while Sosa has provided guidance for courts in recognizing
rights of action under the ATS, there is currently no agreed-upon
standard regarding the determination of liability for complicity in
these violations.
The problem created by the lack of consensus on a complicity
standard is illustrated by comparing the Ninth Circuit’s Unocal deci-
sions with the decision in Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman
Energy Corp.148  In Unocal, the Ninth Circuit adopted the aiding an
abetting standard articulated by the International Criminal Tribu-
nals for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (ICTR and ICTY, re-
spectively).149  The concurring opinion in Unocal disagreed with the
146. Id. (holding that “plaintiffs will need to show that either aiding and abetting
international law violations or doing business in apartheid South Africa are violations of
the law of nations that are ‘accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity
comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms’ such as piracy and crimes
against ambassadors” (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004)).
147. Tel-Oren v. Lybian Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J., concurring).
148. Presbytarian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289.
149. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 949–50.  The International Criminal Tribunal for the for-
mer Yugoslavia (ICTY) was established in 1993 by the United Nations Security Council,
pursuant to the Security Council’s authority under Chapter VII of the United Nations
Charter. See Statute of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, May 3,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192 (1993) [hereinafter International Tribunal Statute — Yugoslavia].
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) was established in 1994 under
the same authority. See Statute of the International Tribunal for Rwanda, Nov. 8, 1994,
33 I.L.M. 1602 (1994) [hereinafter International Tribunal Statute — Rwanda].  Chap-
ter VII of the U.N. Charter is entitled: “Action with respect to the peace, breaches of the
peace, and acts of aggression.”  U.N. Charter ch. VII.  Article 39 proclaims: “The Secur-
ity Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace breach of the peace
or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measure shall be
taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42.” Id. at art. 39.  Articles 41 and 42 concern
the various measures available to the Security Council. See id. at arts. 41–42.  While
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majority’s reasoning in adopting the ICTY aiding and abetting stan-
dard and urged the use of domestic common law standards to de-
cide the issue of complicity liability.150  Soon after the Ninth
Circuit’s decision to vacate the initial Unocal decision,151 Presbyterian
Church of Sudan was decided in the Southern District of New York,
announcing a denial of summary judgment based on the same aid-
ing and abetting standard, the uncertainty of which, in part,
prompted the Ninth Circuit to vacate the Unocal decision.152
Additionally, in 2002, in Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.,153
the Southern District of New York denied summary judgment to
the defendants for claims based on complicity, but used an entirely
different set of standards based on state action under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983154 jurisprudence: “To determine whether a private actor acts
under color of law in the context of a claim under [the ATS] and
the TVPA [the Torture Victims Protection Act], the Court must
look to the standards developed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”155  More
recently, the same court, in In re Apartheid Litigation, declared that
creation of prosecuting tribunals is not expressly mentioned, the enumerated list is not
exclusive or exhaustive. See U.N. Charter ch. VII.
150. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 963, 969 (Reinhardt, J., concurring) (proposing that the
question of liability for complicity is ancillary to the issue of liability for the underlying
actions, and that the federal common law principles of joint venture, agency, and reck-
less disregard should be applied).
151. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (announcing rehearing en banc).
152. Presbytarian Church, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 320–21.
153. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 96 CIV. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL 319887
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
154. § 1983 reads in full:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, sub-
jects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privi-
leges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial
officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, in-
junctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any
Act of Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be
considered to be a statute of the District of Columbia.
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000).
155. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887, at *13 (citing Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 242 (2nd
Cir. 1995)).
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aiding and abetting is not a universally recognized legal obliga-
tion.156  The court implied, however, that the state action analysis
used by the Wiwa court was a proper way to assess secondary liability
under the ATS.157  Therefore, a sufficient showing of state action
could, on that theory, arguably subject secondary actors to liability
under the ATS.
Until the December 2004 announcement of settlement negoti-
ations in the Unocal case,158 the parties were awaiting a decision
after a rehearing en banc by the Ninth Circuit.  The question
presented for rehearing en banc revealed the heart of the problem:
Under the Alien Tort Statute, may Unocal Corporation
be held liable for the forced labor, murder, rape, and tor-
ture inflicted on natives of Burma/Myanmar by the My-
anmar Military in the course of construction of a gas
pipeline?  In order to determine if Unocal may be held
liable for the acts of the government of Myanmar, should
the federal courts apply an international-law aiding and
abetting standard, or should Unocal’s liability be resolved
according to general federal common law tort
principles?159
The Unocal majority had found that the factors listed in the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws160 supported the application of
principles of international law.161  These factors included, “ ‘the
156. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
157. Id. at 548.  Rather than declaring that state action is not a proper basis upon
which to assess liability of indirect actors, the court held: “Here, plaintiffs do not allege
actions by the defendants that elevate them to the status of state actors in the commis-
sion of torture, genocide, killings, and other serious crimes.” Id.  The court distin-
guished the facts in Wiwa: “In Wiwa, plaintiffs alleged that defendants actively
cooperated with Nigerian officials in the suppression of a group that was in opposition
to the defendants’ activities in the region.  Defendants made payments to the military,
contracted to purchase weapons for the military, coordinated raids on the group, and
paid the military to violently respond to opposition.  These activities are not present
here.” Id. at 549 (citations omitted).
158. See supra notes 140–41 and accompanying text. R
159. Status Report and Summary of Pending En Banc Cases, United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit (June 13, 2005) (on file with the New York Law School Law
Review).
160. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969).
161. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 949 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh’g granted, 395
F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
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needs . . . of the international system[ ],’”162 “ ‘the relevant policies
of the forum,’”163 and, perhaps most importantly, “regarding ‘the
protection of justified expectations,’ the ‘certainty, predictability
and uniformity of result, and the ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied.’”164  The Unocal majority ad-
ded that, since the purpose behind the ATS is to provide remedies
for torts based on international law violations, the purpose of the
statute is better served by applying international law to the complic-
ity allegations, which are also tort-related.165  Similarly, the South-
ern District of New York, in Presbyterian Church of Sudan,166
concluded that “in order to determine whether a cause of action
exists under the [ATS], courts must look to international law.”167
Recently, the court in In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11,
2001168 found that the ATS “may provide a basis for a concerted
action claim of material support by alien-Plaintiffs here.”169  The
case, involving secondary liability for the terrorist attacks of Septem-
ber 11, 2001, relied on Presbyterian Church of Sudan, which noted
that “‘courts, including the Second Circuit, have almost unani-
mously permitted actions premised on a theory of aiding and abet-
ting and conspiracy.’”170  The Presbyterian Church of Sudan court’s
phrasing of its holding, however, is problematic, as is the In re Ter-
rorist Attacks court’s reliance on it; a more accurate way to phrase
the situation is: While the Second Circuit, like most others, has per-
mitted actions premised on aiding and abetting and conspiracy in
various domestic tort claims and criminal cases,171 there is no Sec-
ond Circuit case law involving aiding and abetting or conspiracy
162. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969)) (altera-
tion in original).
163. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969)).
164. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969)).
165. Id.
166. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
167. Id. at 321.
168. In re Terrorist Attacks on September 11, 2001, 349 F. Supp. 2d 765 (S.D.N.Y.
2005).
169. Id. at 826.
170. Id. (quoting Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 321).
171. Aiding and abetting is commonly relied upon in various domestic criminal
and civil contexts.  For example, aiding and abetting a breach of fiduciary duty is a civil
cause of action in state courts. See, e.g., Briarpatch, Ltd. v. Phoenix Pictures, Inc., 373
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theories under the ATS or under any international law based cause
of action.  The court found that the ATS provides a cause of action
where “‘(1) an alien sues (2) for a tort (3) committed in violation of
the law of nations (i.e., international law).’”172  The court then rea-
soned that, since “‘aircraft hijacking is generally recognized as a
violation of international law,’”173 the ATS provides a cause of ac-
tion for aiding and abetting such an offense because there is Sec-
ond Circuit precedent applying aiding and abetting theories.174
The ATS provides a forum for certain causes of action in interna-
tional law that are recognized in our common law.  The Second
Circuit, however, has applied only domestic aiding and abetting
theories.  An action for aiding and abetting under the ATS must be
defined in international law.
 Sosa has now directed that courts use caution and demand
specificity when recognizing rights of action under customary inter-
national law. Sosa has implicitly ratified the rights of action — tor-
ture, genocide, forced labor, certain war crimes — that have been
recognized in the modern ATS cases,175 but where does Sosa leave
the complicity standard?  A cause of action for complicity under the
ATS does not currently exist under Sosa’s strictly limited field.  Such
a cause of action must be defined in international law.  An ap-
proach that initially applies international law to the underlying alle-
gations but then applies domestic law to the complicity claims
would undermine the concerns for notice, uniformity, and predict-
ability noted by the Unocal court.  Further, because actions based
on complicity have been treated as separate causes of action, the
language of the statute itself — authorizing suits for torts commit-
ted in violation of international law — mandates that the complicity
claims be defined in international law.
F.3d 296 (2d Cir. 2004).  For a discussion of aiding and abetting in U.S. state and fed-
eral criminal law, see WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW (4th ed. 2003).
172. In re Terrorist Attacks, 349 F. Supp. 2d at 826 (quoting Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 238 (2d Cir. 1995)) (emphasis added).
173. Id. (quoting Burnett v. Al Baraka Inv. & Dev. Corp., 274 F. Supp.2d 86, 100
(D.C. Cir. 2003)).
174. Id. (citing Burnett, 274 F. Supp. 2d. 86; Presbyterian Church of Sudan, 244 F.
Supp. 2d 289).
175. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732–33 & nn.20–21 (discussing Filartiga
and Kadic, and the codification of Filartiga by the Torture Victims Protection Act
(TVPA)).
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-3\NLR301.txt unknown Seq: 31 19-JUN-06 11:12
2005-2006]LIABILITY FOR TORTS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 787
IV. HOW SHOULD COURTS APPROACH COMPLICITY IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS?
Sosa effectively renders complicity not actionable under the
ATS.  Complicity in international law violations is a distinct cause of
action that must be assessed under an international law standard.176
However, complicity fails the international law standard articulated
by Sosa.
At the time Unocal was decided, only international law norms
that met the ‘universal, specific, and obligatory’ standard were cog-
nizable under the ATS.  The Unocal court applied this standard to
the underlying claims,177 but did not subject the aiding and abet-
ting claims to the same test.  The court essentially determined that
the aiding and abetting standard’s existence as an international law
norm was a sufficient basis for its application to the complicity
claims.  According to the plain language of the statute, which re-
quires that the cause of action be based on a “tort only, in violation
of international law,”178 the mere existence of a standard in interna-
tional law would perhaps be sufficient justification for its applica-
tion to claims brought under the ATS.  In ATS case law, however,
courts have consistently required more than the mere existence of
an international law standard.179  Following Sosa, the bar is arguably
even higher: Sosa instructs that the ATS was enacted for the narrow
purpose of addressing a few specifically defined violations of inter-
national law.180  This further calls into question both the applica-
tion of domestic standards to complicity claims under the ATS, and
the application of international standards that do not meet the
same specificity and universality criteria as those applied to the un-
derlying claims.
Complicit actors have been held liable under the ATS, but only
when their involvement was such that they were treated as direct
176. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 554 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
177. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 944–45 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh’g granted, 395
F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
178. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
179. See supra Part II.B.
180. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 729 (noting that “the jurisdiction was originally understood
to be available to enforce a small number of international norms that a federal court
could properly recognize as within the common law enforceable without further statu-
tory authority”).
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actors.  In Kadic, for example, the claim against Karadzic, the defen-
dant, was based on his capacity as president of the self-proclaimed
republic known as Srpska.181  The opinion makes no mention of
any direct actions taken by Kadic.  The allegations were that “[i]n
his capacity as President, Karadzic possesse[d] ultimate command
authority over the Bosnian-Serb military forces, and the injuries
perpetrated on plaintiffs were committed as part of a pattern of
systematic human rights violations that was directed by Karadzic
and carried out by the military forces under his command.”182  Es-
sentially, Karadzic’s level of control over the direct actors rendered
him liable as if he himself were a direct actor.  The complete con-
trol that the defendant exercised over the primary actors renders
the facts of Kadic distinct from cases such as Unocal, in which there
is attenuation between the acts of the primary and secondary actors
and in which there are serious questions about the level of control
the secondary actors commanded over the primary actors.  In cases
such as Kadic, then, it is appropriate to fold the analysis of liability
with respect to the secondary actors into that of the primary actors.
In cases such as Unocal, however, a separate analysis of the liability
of the secondary actors is warranted.
A. Domestic Law Approaches
1. State Action Requirement and § 1983 Analysis
Pre-Sosa, courts held that complicit secondary actors who are
not state actors can be held liable for the conduct of primary actors
who are state actors if such primary actors’ conduct constitutes a
violation of international law.183  The state action analysis, however,
breaks down when applied to causes of action for complicity under
the ATS when the primary actor is not a state actor: Because viola-
tions of international law may be committed by private actors, ATS
claims are not limited to conduct by state actors, whereas the state
action analysis is by definition limited to cases in which the primary
actors are state actors.  Post-Sosa, moreover, even if the primary ac-
tor is a state actor, the state action test, essentially a federal common
181. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 237 (2d Cir. 1995).
182. Id.
183. Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 2002 WL 319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002); In
re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp.2d 538 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
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law standard, is not applicable to causes of action for complicity
under the ATS because the statute provides a forum for torts com-
mitted in violation of the law of nations only.
The issue of which violations, if any, of international law may
be actionable under the ATS against private actors was addressed in
Tel-Oren.184  There was no majority opinion in that case, and the
case was dismissed for failure to state a claim based on a norm of
international law.  One of the more frequently cited statements
made by Judge Edwards in his concurring opinion was that there
exists a “handful of crimes to which the law of nations attributes
individual responsibility.”185  Judge Edwards concluded that it was
not coincidental that the Filartiga court, in declaring torture action-
able under the ATS as a violation of the law of nations, compared
the torturer to pirates and slave traders, whom he called hostis
humanis generis — enemies of all mankind.186  Judge Edwards ex-
plained that “[h]istorically these offenses held a special place in the
law of nations: their perpetrators, dubbed enemies of all mankind,
were susceptible to prosecution by any nations capturing them.”187
Later, Kadic cited to Edwards’s opinion in Tel-Oren, along with
other authority, in declaring that the law of nations no longer limits
its reach to state action.188  Nevertheless, the offenses for which lia-
bility can be assessed against non-state actors are limited.  Judge Ed-
184. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984).  As Judge
Edwards noted, there was precedent establishing that liability could be assessed under
the ATS against a private actor for a violation of international law. Id. at 793 & n.24
(Edwards, J., concurring).  In Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961), the Mary-
land District Court declared that the law of nations and private international law are
not mutually exclusive.  “The injunctions of international law that may applicable to the
private individual do not necessarily disappear when he enters the territory of his own
or of any other State.  He learns that there are acts of which that law there itself forbids
the commission by any one whomsoever.” Id. at 864.  The case of Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F.
Cas. 810 (D. S.C. 1795), cited to the original version of the ATS (contained in section 9
of the Judiciary Act of the first Congress) for authority granting the court jurisdiction.
Bolchos concerned a captor’s claim for restitution of property that was seized from the
captured enemy ship. Id.  The “property” in question consisted of slaves on board the
ship. Id.  If no other rebuttal exists for those who decline to accept the Filartiga court’s
admonition that we must define international law as it exists today and not as it was in
1789, the facts of the Bolchos case should suffice.
185. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795 (Edwards, J., concurring).
186. Id. at 781 (citing Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980)).
187. Id.
188. Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 239 (2d Cir. 1995).
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wards noted that Filartiga concerned official torture, whereas Tel-
Oren concerned acts by the PLO, which the court did not recognize
as an official body.189  Edwards was not willing to “extend the defini-
tion of the ‘law of nations’”190 to include torture among the hand-
ful of crimes for which individual liability may be assessed.191  The
Kadic court indicated that these offenses are limited to piracy, slave
trade and certain war crimes;192 claims for other offenses may be
pursued to the extent that the defendant is shown to be a state
actor.193
While there was no need in Kadic or Tel-Oren to address what
standard should determine whether a defendant was a state actor
for adjudicating violations of international law for which state ac-
tion is still a requirement, other courts have looked to the jurispru-
dence surrounding 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for guidance.194  The Wiwa
court, having concluded that the plaintiffs must demonstrate state
action in order for their claims to proceed,195 looked to the stan-
dards developed under § 1983 and explained that “[t]he relevant
test in this case is the ‘joint action’ test, under which private actors
are considered state actors if they are ‘willful participant[s] in joint
action with the State or its agents.’”196  The court was satisfied that
189. Tel-Oren, 726 F. 2d at 791 & n.21 (Edwards, J., concurring).
190. Id. at 792.
191. Id. at 795.
192. Kadic, 70 F. 3d. at 239–40.
193. Id. at 244.
194. See, e.g., Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, 96 CIV. 8386(KMW), 2002 WL
319887 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 28, 2002).
195. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 at *13 (citations omitted).  The Wiwa plaintiffs also
asserted claims under section 2 of the Torture Victims Protection Act (TVPA), which
reads, in relevant part:
Establishment of civil action.
(a) Liability.  An individual who, under actual or apparent authority, or
color of law, of any foreign nation (1) subjects an individual to torture
shall, in a civil action, be liable for damages to that individual; or
(2) subjects an individual to extrajudicial killing shall, in a civil action, be
liable for damages to the individual’s legal representative, or to any person
who may be a claimant in an action for wrongful death.
28 U.S.C. § 1350(2) (2000).  Thus the TVPA expressly limits its reach to state ac-
tors.  Additionally, since the TVPA, unlike the ATS, provides a federal, statutorily de-
fined cause of action, federal courts properly apply domestic standards and precedent
to TVPA claims.
196. Wiwa, 2002 WL 319887 at *13 (citing Dennis v. Sparks, 449 U.S. 24, 27 (1980))
(second alteration in original).
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the plaintiffs had supported a theory of joint action based on a
“substantial degree of cooperative action”197 between the corporate
defendants and the Nigerian government, which had carried out
the alleged acts in violation of international law.198  Implicit in the
court’s analysis, however, was the erroneous requirement that the
primary actor be a state actor.
Further, the Wiwa court did not examine the propriety of ap-
plying federal common law, developed in the context of a federal
statute, to assess secondary liability for violations of international
law under the ATS.  The complicity analysis was melded with the
state action analysis.  The result was the application of a domestic
federal standard to determine whether a right of action existed in
international law against secondary actors.  This approach is errone-
ous when applied to complicity claims because the plain language
of the ATS demands that an international standard be applied to
assess a cause of action for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations.
The plaintiffs in In re Apartheid Litigation relied on Wiwa’s
§ 1983 state action analysis in their allegations of state action by the
defendants who had invested in South Africa during the apartheid
regime.199  The court did not question the Wiwa analysis, instead
distinguishing the cases factually by pointing to the much higher
level of engagement of the Wiwa defendants with the subject host
government as compared to the South African defendants’ involve-
ment with the apartheid regime.  The In re Apartheid Litigation court
noted that “[i]n Wiwa, plaintiffs alleged that defendants actively co-
operated with Nigerian officials. . . .  Defendants made payments to
the military, contracted to purchase weapons for the military, coor-
dinated raids on the group, and paid the military to violently re-
spond to opposition.  These activities are not present here.”200  The
In re Apartheid Litigation court, by distinguishing the case from Wiwa
on its facts rather than on its law, effectively affirmed the use of the
§ 1983 jurisprudence as a mechanism for assessing secondary liabil-
ity in international law.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 548–49 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
200. Id. at 549.
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2. Other Federal Common Law Approaches
The Unocal decision may have been vacated, at least in part,
because the concurring opinion by Judge Reinhardt endorsed the
use of various domestic federal common law principles to resolve
the complicity issue.201  Reinhardt’s position, as expressed in his
concurrence, that federal common law should be applied to the
complicity liability issue was premised upon his (1) consideration of
this issue as ancillary to the question of direct liability to the under-
lying acts; (2) characterization of Unocal Corp.’s role as derivative
and based on third party liability; and (3) classification of the un-
derlying right of action as legislatively derived.202
Judge Reinhardt apparently saw the court’s task as one of judi-
cial interpretation and application of a legislatively defined right of
action.  Reinhardt stated, “There is another reason why the applica-
tion of federal common law is appropriate here: we are required to
resolve issues ancillary to a cause of action created by Congress.
The Supreme Court has stated that in such cases, courts should ap-
ply federal common law ‘to fill the interstices of federal legisla-
tion.’”203  This authority of the court to fill interstices of legislative
rights of action is inapposite because claims under the ATS involve
rights of action defined not by legislation but by international law
norms recognized under common law.  In Sosa, the Supreme Court
held that the ATS is a jurisdictional statute created to grant power
to the courts to hear cases involving a “modest number of interna-
tional law violations with a potential for personal liability at the
time,”204 and, “a narrow class of international norms today.”205  Yet
the question remains whether courts should apply municipal fed-
eral common law to fill the interstices of an international law-based
right of action — particularly in ATS cases, when the standard is a
universal one.
Reinhardt, in his Unocal concurrence, stated that “courts
should not substitute international law principles for established
201. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 963 (9th Cir. 2002) (Reinhardt, J., concurring)
(proposing that the question of liability for complicity is ancillary to the issue of liability
for the underlying actions), vacated, reh’g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
202. Id.
203. Id. at 965 (citing United States v. Kimbell Foods, 440 U.S. 715, 727 (1979)).
204. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 725 (2004).
205. Id. at 729.
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federal common law or other domestic law principles . . . unless a
statute mandates that substitution . . . .”206  The ATS, by its terms,
mandates a substitution of international law principles for domestic
law.  The statute provides jurisdiction “for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”207
The proposed use of the domestic principles of joint venture liabil-
ity,208 agency liability,209 and reckless disregard210 would substitute
domestic principles when those of international law are mandated.
B. International Law Approach
The reasons for applying standards of international law to
claims arising from the primary conduct under the ATS apply
equally to claims based on the secondary, complicit acts.211  In re-
gard to the aiding and abetting standard, this raises the question of
why the distinction matters whether the standard applied is domes-
tic or international when the two are nearly identical.  The Unocal
court noted the similarity between the aiding and abetting standard
under international law and the aiding and abetting standard
under domestic tort law:
The Furundzija standard for aiding and abetting liability
under international criminal law can be summarized as
knowing practical assistance, encouragement, or moral
support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration
of the crime. At least with respect to assistance and en-
couragement, this standard is similar to the standard for
aiding and abetting under domestic tort law. Thus, the
Restatement of Torts states: “For harm resulting to a third
person from the tortious conduct of another, one is sub-
206. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 966 (Reinhardt, J. concurring) (emphasis omitted).
207. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
208. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 963 (Reinhardt, J., concurring).  Interestingly, after stating
that all factors in the choice-of-law inquiry point toward federal common law, id. at 967,
and that joint venture theory is a well-established common law principle, id., the con-
currence states, “the principle that a member of a joint venture is liable for the torts of
its co-venturer is well established in international law . . . .” Id. at 971.
209. Id. at 972–73.  As with the joint venture theory, the concurrence points out
that agency theory is well-established in international law.
210. Id. at 974.
211. See Unocal, 395 F.3d 932; Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman, 244 F.
Supp. 2d 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
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ject to liability if he . . . knows that the other’s conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance
or encouragement to the other so to conduct himself
. . . .”212
So although Unocal emphasized that the ATS was enacted to pro-
vide a right of action in international law,213 that right of action was
ultimately defined by a standard identical to our own domestic law.
The Unocal court, however, found that the factors listed in Re-
statement (Second) of Conflict of Laws supported the application
of international law principles.214  These factors included, “ ‘the
needs . . . of the international system[ ],’”215 “ ‘the relevant policies
of the forum,’”216 and, perhaps most importantly, “regarding ‘the
protection of justified expectations,’ the ‘certainty, predictability
and uniformity of result, and the ease in the determination and
application of the law to be applied.’”217  Additionally, the purpose
behind the ATS is to provide remedies for torts based on interna-
tional law violations.218  Therefore, the purpose of the statute is bet-
ter served by applying international law to the complicity
allegations, which are also tort-related.219  In a more recent deci-
sion, Presbyterian Church of Sudan, the court followed the same rea-
soning.220  Now that Sosa may have rendered the aiding and
212. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 951 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876
(1979)).
213. Id. at 948–49.
214. Id. at 949 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969)).
215. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969)) (altera-
tion in original).
216. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969)).
217. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6 (1969)).
218. Id.
219. Id.
220. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 320 (S.D.N.Y.
2003) (“The [ATS] provides a cause of action in tort for breaches of international law.
In order to determine whether a cause of action exists under the [ATS], courts must
look to international law. Thus, whether or not aiding and abetting and complicity are
recognized with respect to charges of genocide, enslavement, war crimes, and the like is
a question that must be answered by consulting international law.”) (citations omitted).
The court also afforded extensive treatment to the question whether corporations are
capable of violations of international law.  The opinion draws on extensive authority to
support its holding that corporations are capable of violating international law.  By im-
plication, the case holds that corporations may be sued under the ATS.  The Supreme
Court has not ruled on this issue, although there is language in Sosa indicating that
\\server05\productn\N\NLR\50-3\NLR301.txt unknown Seq: 39 19-JUN-06 11:12
2005-2006]LIABILITY FOR TORTS IN VIOLATION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 795
abetting standard inapplicable under the ATS, it is more important
for the complicity analysis to be firmly placed in international law.
1. Does the Aiding and Abetting Standard Satisfy Sosa?
Having decided that the complicity allegations should be de-
cided according to international law, the Unocal court announced
that it would adopt the aiding and abetting standard initially articu-
lated by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugo-
slavia (ICTY) and subsequently followed and further explained by
the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR).221  The
standard was derived from the ICTY’s examination of the post-
World War II statutes that were adopted in order to prosecute war
criminals for atrocities and from the case law that developed from
those prosecutions.222  Essentially, the ICTY and ICTR found that
the aiding and abetting standard was established as customary inter-
national law, and  several U.S. courts agreed that the standard was
well established in international law.223
corporations are included in the ambit of the ATS: “A related consideration is whether
international law extends the scope of liability for a violation of a given norm to the
perpetrator being sued, if the defendant is a private actor such as a corporation or an
individual.”  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.20 (2004) (emphasis added).
221. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950–51.  The Tribunals included an additional element of
“moral support” that the Unocal court declined to adopt.  The majority reasoned that,
the adoption of the aiding and abetting standard was in large part validated by its simi-
larity to established precedent, as illustrated by the Restatement (Second) of Torts. Id.
The Restatement provides: “For harm resulting to a third person from the tortious con-
duct of another, one is subject to liability if he . . . (b) knows that the other’s conduct
constitutes a breach of duty and gives substantial assistance or encouragement to the
other so to conduct himself.” RESTATEMENTS (SECOND) OF TORTS § 876 (1979).  In con-
trast, the standard articulated by the International Criminal Tribunal for the former
Yugoslavia is: “The actus reus of aiding and abetting in international criminal law re-
quires practical assistance, encouragement, or moral support which has a substantial
effect on the perpetration of the crime.”  Unocal, 395 F.2d at 950 (citation omitted).
The court declined to adopt the ‘moral support’ element, which had no corresponding
element in domestic precedent. Id. at 951 & n.28.  The concurrence found this selec-
tive incorporation of an international law standard problematic. Id. at 963 (Reinhardt,
J., concurring).  A full exploration of this issue is a topic for another paper; however, it
should be noted that the element of moral support is articulated in the alternative.
Regarding the mens rea, what is required is, “ ‘knowledge that [the accomplice’s] actions
will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the crime.’” Id. at 950 (quoting Prose-
cutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶ 235, 245 (Dec. 10, 1998)).
222. See Unocal, 395 F.3d at 948–49.
223. See, e.g., Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, 198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2002)
(examining aiding and abetting standard and finding, “Principles of accomplice liabil-
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The aiding and abetting standard, which calls for “knowing
practical assistance or encouragement which has a substantial effect
on the perpetration of the crime,”224 meets the definition of a cus-
tomary international law norm, but it fails to meet the Sosa criteria
for purposes of the ATS.  In order for a federal court to find that
the aiding and abetting standard satisfies Sosa, such court must find
that the standard is an international law norm “of international
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a speci-
ficity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms we
have recognized.”225  Specifically, the inquiry must turn to whether
the norm is as definite, specific, and widely accepted as the prohibi-
tions against violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights
of ambassadors, and piracy were at the time the ATS was enacted.226
Additionally, courts must be satisfied that the standard does not of-
fend the prudential considerations articulated by the Supreme
Court.227
Recently, the In re Apartheid Litigation court disagreed that the
aiding and abetting standard was “universally accepted as a legal
obligation.”228  The court explicitly declared that the aiding and
abetting standard must satisfy Sosa for a cause of action in complic-
ity to lie under the ATS.229  Whether or not the standard would
ity are well-established under international law.”); Unocal, 395 F.2d at 950 n.26 (“The
Furundzija Tribunal based its actus reus standard for aiding and abetting on an exhaus-
tive analysis of international case law and international instruments.”); Presbyterian
Church of Sudan, 244 F. Supp. 2d at 322 (“Indeed, the concept of complicit liability for
conspiracy or aiding and abetting is well-developed in international law . . . .”).
224. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 947.
225. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725.
226. Id. at 724, 729 (holding that “we have found no basis to suspect Congress had
any examples in mind beyond those torts corresponding to Blackstone’s three primary
offenses: violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and
piracy,” and further explaining that “[t]he jurisdiction was originally understood to be
available to enforce a small number of international norms that a federal court could
properly recognize as within the common law enforceable without further statutory
authority.”).
227. Id. at 725–28.
228. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
229. Id. (“[P]laintiffs will need to show that either aiding international law viola-
tions or doing business in apartheid South Africa are violations of the law of nations
that are ‘accepted by the civilized world and defined with a specificity comparable to
the features of the 18th-century paradigms’ such as piracy and crimes against ambassa-
dors.” (quoting Sosa, 542 U.S. at 725)).
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satisfy customary international standard in a context outside the
ATS was not addressed.  The court only noted that none of the
sources offered by the plaintiffs to establish the status of the aiding
and abetting standard under international law “establish[ed] a
clearly-defined norm for [ATS] purposes.”230  The court relied on the
Supreme Court’s discussion of aiding and abetting in Central Bank
of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver.231 Central Bank concerned
the application of aider and abettor liability in actions arising under
section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.232  The In re
Apartheid Litigation court held that “where Congress has not explic-
itly provided for aider and abettor liability in civil causes of action,
it should not be inferred.”233  The court found that “the [ATS]
presently does not provide for aider and abettor liability, and this
Court will not write it into the statute.”234  This, however, does not
answer the inquiry into specificity or universality that Sosa requires.
The In re Apartheid Litigation court appears to have applied the
same analysis that Judge Reinhardt applied in his concurrence in
Unocal by viewing causes of action under the ATS as statutorily de-
fined: The court declared that the ATS does not provide for aider
and abettor liability, but the court failed to note that the ATS does
not provide in any enumerative way for any liability, except for a
“tort only, in violation of the law of nations . . . .”235  The cause of
action is defined by international law, not by the ATS, so the ab-
sence of specific language within the ATS regarding aiding and
abetting is irrelevant, and the court’s focus of attention on whether
to ‘write it into the statute’ is misplaced.  The court’s treatment,
however, of the Sosa prudential factors is particularly apt consider-
230. Id. at 549–50 (emphasis added).
231. Id. at 550 (citing Cent. Bank of Denver v. First Interstate Bank of Denver, 511
U.S. 164, 181 (1994)).
232. Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at 166 (explaining that “[a]s we have interpreted it,
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 imposes private civil liability on those
who commit a manipulative or deceptive act in connection with the purchase or sale of
securities.  In this case, we must answer . . . whether private civil liability under § 10(b)
extends as well to those who do not engage in the manipulative or deceptive practice
. . . .”).
233. In re Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d at 550 (citing Cent. Bank, 511 U.S. at
181–82, 189–90).
234. Id.
235. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000).
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ing Sosa had discussed the (then-)pending In re Apartheid Litigation
case: The Sosa court found that “another possible limitation that we
need not apply here is a policy of case-specific deference to the
political branches.”236  Although the Sosa claim was disposed of
without such application, the Court pointed to In re Apartheid Litiga-
tion as a specific case in which such deference would be required:
The Government of South Africa has said that these cases
interfere with the policy embodied by its Truth and Rec-
onciliation Commission, which “deliberately avoided a
‘victors’ justice’ approach to the crimes of apartheid and
chose instead one based on confession and absolution, in-
formed by the principles of reconciliation, reconstruc-
tion, reparation and goodwill.”237
This approach, which Sosa acknowledged but to which In re
Apartheid Litigation did not allude, points all of the prudential fac-
tors away from adjudicating the case under any standard, not only
the aiding and abetting standard.  This and the absence of any anal-
ysis of the specificity or universality of the aiding and abetting stan-
dard, therefore, somewhat limit the precedential value of In re
Apartheid Litigation for other secondary liability claims that may
arise under different circumstances.
2. Must the Complicity Standard Satisfy Sosa?
The two pre-Sosa cases that have applied the aiding and abet-
ting standard under the ATS, Unocal and Presbytarian Church of Su-
dan, both applied a different standard to the underlying allegations
than they did to the complicity claims.
Unocal applied the ‘specific, universal, and obligatory’ stan-
dard, which was then the majority approach to ATS claims, to the
underlying claims against the primary actors, the Myanmar military.
Although the ultimate issue in Unocal was Unocal Corp.’s alleged
complicity, the court’s initial inquiry was whether the underlying
claims were violations of international law: The court stated that
236. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004).
237. Id. at 733 (quoting Declaration by Penuell Mpapa Maduna, Minister of Justice
and Constitutional Development, Republic of South Africa (July 11, 2003), reprinted in
Brief of the Government of Commonwealth of Australia et al. as Amici Curiae in Sup-
port of the Petitioner app. b, at 7a, Sosa, 542 U.S. 692 (2004) (No. 03-339)).
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“[o]ne threshold question in any [ATS] case is whether the alleged
tort is a violation of the law of nations.”238 Unocal utilized the bene-
fit of recent precedent assessing human rights violations and the
intervening twenty years of relevant ATS precedent.239  However,
the court also engaged in a direct inquiry into the sources of inter-
national law, requiring, at a minimum, a showing of “universal, spe-
cific, and obligatory”240 international norms and holding that
forced labor meets the most rigorous standard of a jus cogens241 vio-
lation of international law.  The court looked to the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (banning “slavery and servi-
tude” and establishing the right to “free choice of employment”),242
the Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major
War Criminals of the European Axis (the London Agreement) (es-
tablishing an International Military Tribunal for prosecution of war
crimes, including “deportation to slave labor” and crimes against
humanity, including “enslavement”),243 and the Charter of the In-
238. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 945 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh’g granted, 395
F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
239. Id. See, e.g., United States v. Matta-Ballestros, 71 F.3d 754, 764 n.5 (9th Cir.
1995) (noting that torture, murder, genocide and slavery are jus cogens norms) (citing
Siderman de Blake v. Republic of Arg., 965 F.2d 699, 717 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied,
507 U.S. 1017 (1993) (“We conclude that the right to be free from official torture is
fundamental and universal, a right deserving of the highest status under international
law, a norm of jus cogens.”)).  The Unocal court also relied on precedent that declared
rape a form of torture. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 945 (citing Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825,
852, 854 (1994) (Blackmun, J., concurring) (describing brutal prison rape as “the
equivalent of” and “nothing less than torture” (emphasis added)); Kadic v. Karadzic, 70
F.3d 232, 242 (2d Cir. 1995) (describing allegations of “murder, rape, forced impregna-
tion, and other forms of torture” (emphasis added)); In re Extradition of Suarez-Mason,
984 F. Supp. 676, 682 (N.D. Cal 1988) (stating that “shock sessions were interspersed
with rapes and other forms of torture” (emphasis added))).
240. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 944 (“We have held that the [ATS] also provides a cause of
action, as long as ‘plaintiffs . . . allege a violation of “specific, universal, and obligatory”
international norms as part of [their] [ATS] claim.’”) (omission and second alteration
in original) (citation omitted).
241. Id. at 945 (holding that “forced labor is so widely condemned that it has
achieved the status of a jus cogens violation”). Jus cogens (jes KOH-jenz) is a Latin phrase
meaning “compelling law,” and is used to refer to a “mandatory or peremptory norm of
general international law accepted and recognized by the international community as a
norm from which no derogation is permitted.” BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY (8th ed. 2004).
242. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (III), ¶¶ 4, 23(1),
U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (Dec. 10, 1948).
243. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis (London Agreement) and Charter of the International Military
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ternational Military Tribunal (making forced labor a war crime)244
as part of its inquiry into sources of international law.245 Unocal also
looked to the Thirteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution,246
which had been characterized by the Supreme Court as having
been enacted to maintain a system of free and voluntary labor.247
In determining the standard to apply to the complicity claims
against the secondary actors, Unocal found “recent decisions by the
[ICTY] and [ICTR] especially helpful for ascertaining the current
standard for aiding and abetting under international law as it per-
tains to the [ATS].”248  This statement implies that the aiding and
abetting standard is the current standard under international law,
and that it is the current standard applicable to the ATS.  There was
no further inquiry as to whether the aiding and abetting standard
satisfied the specific, universal, and obligatory standard — or
whether it was even required to do so.  The court’s subsequent dis-
cussion of the methodology of the ICTY and ICTR in developing
and articulating the aiding and abetting standard249 demonstrates
just what this standard may currently be in international law, but
there was no comparable demonstration of how it meets the ‘spe-
cific, universal, and obligatory’ test that the court had identified for
recognizing violations under the ATS.
Presbyterian Church of Sudan applied a different standard to the
underlying claims of the primary conduct than it did to the com-
plicity claims.  Regarding the primary claims, the court found that
rights of action under the ATS must be based on conduct that vio-
lates “well established, universally recognized norms of interna-
tional law,”250 and that “[u]nder the [ATS], any violation of a
specific, universal, and obligatory international norm is actiona-
ble . . . .”251  Regarding the complicity claims, however, the court
Tribunal, Charter arts. 6(b)–(c), Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, available at http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/proc/imtchart.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
244. Id. at Charter art. 6(b).
245. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 945.
246. U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
247. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 946 (citing Pollock v. Williams, 322 U.S. 4, 17 (1944)).
248. Id. at 950.
249. Id. at 951.
250. Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman, 244 F. Supp. 2d 289, 304 (S.D.N.Y.
2003).
251. Id. at 306.
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found that “whether or not aiding and abetting and complicity are
recognized with respect to charges of genocide, enslavement, war
crimes, and the like is a question that must be answered by consult-
ing international law,”252 and that “the concept of complicit liability
for . . . aiding and abetting is well-developed in international law
. . . .”253  The court did not explain the disparity between the ‘spe-
cific, universal, and obligatory’ requirement for the primary claims
and the ‘well-developed’ standard in international law it applied to
the complicity claims.254
As noted before, Filartiga explained why the prima facie legal
hurdle for recognition under the ATS is higher than that of mere
binding international law: “The requirement that a rule command
the ‘general assent of civilized nations’ to become binding upon
them all is a stringent one.  Were this not so, the courts of one
nation might feel free to impose idiosyncratic legal rules upon
others, in the name of applying international law.”255  Whether or
not this fully explains the traditional approach, the current reality is
that the recognition of rights of action in international law under
the ATS must satisfy a higher standard than customary international
law.  In spite of the caution which has traditionally been employed
and is now expressly required, there is evidence of a broader ac-
ceptance of international norms.  In addition to its cautious lan-
guage, Filartiga emphasized that the ATS does not create new rights
under international law; instead, it should be construed “simply as
opening the federal courts for adjudication of rights already recog-
nized by international law.”256  Similarly, Paquete Habana, in discuss-
ing sources of international law, had declared that “[s]uch works
are resorted to by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their
252. Id. at 320.
253. Id. at 322 (emphasis added).
254. Similarly, in Mehinovic v. Vuckovic, the district court found that the underlying
allegations were actionable under international law because they “contravene[d] ‘well
established, universally recognized norms of international law,’” and that the relevant
international norms were “specific, universal and obligatory.”  Mehinovic v. Vuckovic,
198 F. Supp. 2d 1322, 1355 (N.D. Ga. 2002) (citation omitted).  As to the claims of
secondary liability, however, the court was satisfied that aiding and abetting was the
appropriate standard to apply because “[p]rinciples of accomplice liability are well-estab-
lished under international law. Id. (emphasis added).
255. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 881 (2d Cir. 1980).
256. Id. at 887.
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authors concerning what the law ought to be, but for trustworthy
evidence of what the law really is.”257  If the prohibition against aid-
ing and abetting is already recognized in international law, then
perhaps once a primary claim passes the Sosa threshold, the com-
plicity standard will be assessed based on a customary international
law standard.
There is reason to believe that applying a different standard to
allegations of complicity will not be well received by the lower fed-
eral courts or by the Supreme Court.  The Sosa decision allowing
the lower federal courts to recognize rights of action in interna-
tional law at all was seen by some as problematic:
That approach . . . of course again relegated to the lower
federal courts the task of grappling with and determining
what offenses against international law fit within that nar-
row class of offenses.  The consequences of leaving that
door open, as Justice Scalia stated [in Sosa], were not only
to make the task of the lower federal courts immeasurably
more difficult, but also to invite the kind of judicial crea-
tivity that has caused the disparity of results and differ-
ences of opinion that preceded the decision in Sosa.258
This resistance is likely to be even stronger in the face of an ap-
proach that allows courts to apply a broader standard to complicit
acts.  However, there is reason to ask: Will courts prefer, instead, to
leave potential plaintiffs without any remedy at all against complicit
actors?  The judicial interest in providing a complete remedy259
may demand that courts consider using the aiding and abetting
standard based upon its current status as a mere customary binding
international norm, in spite of its shortcomings under Sosa.
257. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
258. In re S. Afr. Apartheid Litig., 346 F. Supp. 2d 538, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
259. See, e.g., 30A C.J.S. Equity § 24 (explaining that “[a] remedy at law cannot be
considered adequate, so as to prevent equitable relief, unless it covers the entire case
made by the bill in equity.  To oust equitable jurisdiction, the remedy at law has been
required to be so complete that it attains the full end and justice of the case, reaching
the whole mischief and securing the whole right of the party.  So, where a legal remedy
is available, but would afford only a partial protection of plaintiff’s entire right, or
would not entirely adjust the rights of the parties, such remedy is incomplete and inade-
quate, and for that reason equity will interpose.”  This implies the judicial interest of
providing a complete remedy — if possible, at law; or else, in equity) (citations omitted).
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The aiding and abetting standard arguably has reached the sta-
tus of customary international law, in spite of its relatively recent
birth.  The first component of customary international law is that it
“results from general and consistent practice of states . . . .”260  The
implication is that of a slow process whereby understandings de-
velop gradually, from the bottom up.  In the modern world, how-
ever, this process appears to have been expedited by increased ease
of communication and by the very existence of the United Nations
and U.N. General Assembly procedures, in “greatly foreshortening
the requisite time to establish customary law and affording an eco-
nomical mode to articulate consensus about common interest.”261
The International Court of Justice (ICJ) has stated that “the passage
of only a short period of time is not necessarily, or of itself, a bar to
the formation of a new rule of customary international law.”262  The
ICJ was referring to the international legal status of the 1945 Tru-
man Proclamation, in which the United States declared that a
coastal state “had an original, natural and exclusive right to the con-
tinental shelf off its shores.”263  The ICJ found, in 1969, that the
principle articulated in the Truman Proclamation, uttered just over
twenty years prior, was the applicable principle of international
law.264
The standard for aiding and abetting the crimes enumerated
in the various international instruments was developed in various
decisions by the ICTY, in particular, in Prosecutor v. Furundzija.265
Furundzija held that “the actus reus of aiding and abetting in inter-
national criminal law requires practical assistance, encouragement
or moral support which has a substantial effect on the perpetration
260. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§ 102 (2) (1987).
261. LUNG-CHU CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO CONTEMPORARY INTERNATIONAL LAW: A
POLICY ORIENTED PERSPECTIVE 350 (2d ed. 2000).
262. North Sea Cont’l Shelf Cases, 1969 I.C.J. 3, 44 (Feb. 20, 1969), quoted in RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 102, re-
porters notes 2 (1987).
263. North Sea Cont’l Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 44.  A case summary of North Sea Cont’l Shelf
is available at http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/idecisions/isummaries/icssummary
690220.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).
264. North Sea Cont’l Shelf, 1969 I.C.J. at 44.
265. Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 950 (9th Cir. 2002), vacated, reh’g granted, 395
F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003) (citing Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judg-
ment, ¶ 235 (Dec. 10, 1998)).
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of the crime.”266 Unocal summarized the standard as consisting of
“knowing practical assistance or encouragement that has a substan-
tial effect on the perpetration of the crime.”267  The ICTY and
ICTR statutes grant the tribunals authority to prosecute genocide,
including “complicity in genocide,”268 and other crimes against hu-
manity.269  Both statutes provide that “[a] person who planned, in-
stigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the
planning, preparation or execution of a listed crime . . . shall be
individually responsible for the crime.”270
The ICTY’s primary sources were the London Agreement,271
the Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East
266. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T at ¶ 235, quoted in Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950.
The tribunal reasoned that practical assistance need not have actually caused the act to
occur, only that “the acts of the accomplice make a significant difference to the com-
mission of the criminal act by the principal.” Id. at ¶ 233, quoted in Unocal, 395 F.3d at
950.  The mens rea requirement, according the tribunal, is actual or constructive “knowl-
edge that [the accomplice’s] actions will assist the perpetrator in the commission of the
crime.” Id.  Regarding the mens rea, the tribunal held that the accomplice does not
need to share the mens rea of the perpetrator, and that the required knowledge does
not have to be of the specific acts that are to occur. Id. at ¶ 245, quoted in Unocal, 395
F.3d at 950.  If the accused accomplice “is aware that one of a number of crimes will
probably be committed, and one of those crimes is in fact committed, he has intended
to facilitate commission of that crime, and is guilty as an aider and abettor.” Id., quoted
in Unocal, 395 F.3d at 950–51.
267. Unocal, 395 F.3d at 947.
268. International Tribunal Statute — Yugoslavia, supra note 149, at art. 4(3)(e); R
International Tribunal Statute — Rwanda, supra note 149, at art. 2(3)(e). R
269. International Tribunal Statute — Yugoslavia, supra note 149, at arts. 4–5; In- R
ternational Tribunal Statute — Rwanda, supra note 149, at arts. 2–3. R
270. International Tribunal Statute — Yugoslavia, supra note 149, at art. 7(1) (em- R
phasis added); International Tribunal Statute — Rwanda, supra note 149, at art. 6(1) R
(emphasis added).
271. Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of the Major War Criminals
of the European Axis (London Agreement) and Charter of the International Military
Tribunal, Aug. 8, 1945, 82 U.N.T.S. 280, available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/ava-
lon/imt/proc/imtchart.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).  The London Agreement was
entered into by the Governments of the United States of America, the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Union of Socialist Republics, and the provi-
sional Government of French Republic. Id.  The London Agreement adopts the Char-
ter of the International Military Tribunal (which later became known as the Nuremberg
Tribunal) as an integral part of the London Agreement. Id. at art. 2.  The Charter of
the International Military Tribunal in turn establishes secondary liability. Id. at Charter
art. 6.
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establishing the Tokyo Tribunal,272 and the Control Council Law
No. 10.273  These treaties and statutes consistently announce that
complicity in crimes is subject to liability, but no standards are set
forth to determine at what level and under what circumstances such
complicity subjects the complicit actor to liability. Furundzija’s anal-
ysis of the case law, however, revealed some general themes,274
which are: “additional confidence to his companions;”275 presence,
combined with authority;276 the requirement that the acts of the
complicit party must have a substantial effect on the principals;277
and the requirement of knowledge that the acts would be carried
out.278  In its inquiry into the required mens rea on the part of the
accomplice, the court found that the case law overwhelmingly held
that the accomplice need not share the mens rea of the direct actor,
272. Charter of the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 5(c), Jan.
19, 1946 (containing a provision on secondary liability identical to that of the Nurem-
berg Tribunal), available at http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imtfech.htm (last vis-
ited Jan. 6, 2006).
273. Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes,
Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, available at http://www.
yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/imt/imt10.htm (last visited Jan. 6, 2006).  The Control Coun-
cil Law No. 10 was adopted, “in order to give effect to the terms of the Moscow Declara-
tion of 30 October 1943 and the London Agreement of 8 August 1945, and the Charter
issued pursuant thereto and in order to establish a uniform legal basis in Germany for
the prosecution of war criminals and other similar offenders, other than those dealt
with by the International Military Tribunal.” Id.
274. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, Judgment, ¶¶ 193–95 (Dec.
10, 1998).
275. Trial of Franz Schonfeld and Nine Others, Essen, 11–26 June 1946, Vol. XI,
Law Reports 69, 70, quoted in Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T at ¶ 201 & n.224.
276. Strafsenat, Urteil vom 10. August 1948 gegen L. u. a. StS 37/48 (Ent-
scheidungen, Vol. I, pp. 53–56), quoted in Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T at ¶ 208 &
n.230 (referring to Urteil vom 10. August as “the Synagogue case”).  The Furundzija
court’s analysis of this factor is the basis for the “moral support” element, which was not
adopted by the Unocal court. See Doe v. Unocal, 395 F.3d 932, 951 & n.28 (9th Cir.
2002), vacated, reh’g granted, 395 F.3d 978 (9th Cir. 2003).
277. Trial of Otto Ohlendorf and Others (Einsatzgruppen), in Trials of War
criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No.10,
Vol. IV, cited in Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T at ¶ 217 & n.239.
278. See Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T at ¶¶ 219–21 (citing and quoting Trial of
Otto Ohlendorf and Others).  The court concluded that in “the Einsatzgruppen case,
knowledge, rather than intent, was held to be the requisite mental element.” Id. at ¶
237.
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though knowledge on the part of the accomplice must be proven
for liability to attach.279
This aiding and abetting jurisprudence in international law has
been called ‘well developed.’280  The ICTY recently declared that
“the reference in article 4(3)(e) of the Statute [of the ICTY] to
‘complicity in genocide’ can and does include aiding and abet-
ting,”281 and that “aiding and abetting genocide does not represent
an addition to crimes known to customary international law but has
always formed part of that law.”282  Before Sosa, courts found that
when the underlying acts satisfied the ‘universal, specific, and obli-
gatory’ test, the aiding and abetting standard was applicable for
purposes of the ATS according to the ‘well-developed’ test.  This
begs the question: Following Sosa, if the prohibition against the un-
derlying acts is sufficiently specific as to satisfy Sosa, then may the
complicity aspect of the claim still be ascertained based upon rules
that are ‘well-developed’ in customary international law?  This re-
sult seems to defy the reasoning of Sosa but perhaps will be applied
as an interim measure until relevant international law principles
develop.
IV. CONCLUSION
Now that the U.S. Supreme Court has spoken on the require-
ments for recognizing causes of action in international law under
the Alien Tort Statute, the next challenge will likely be the recogni-
tion of complicity claims under the statute.  It is likely that courts
deciding ATS cases involving the aiding and abetting standard will
follow In re Apartheid Litigation and hold that a complicit liability
claim does not survive scrutiny under Sosa.  Additionally, the appli-
cation of § 1983 analysis in assessing an international law-based
right of action will likely not survive review by the Court. Sosa indi-
cates that the Court is inclined to restrict the discretion of the lower
courts in adjudicating ATS claims.  Thus, it is unlikely that the
279. Id. at ¶ 236.
280. See Unocal, 395 F.3d 932; Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy,
Inc., 244 F. Supp. 2d. 289, 322 (S.D.N.Y. 2003).
281. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No: IT-98-33-A, Judgment, pt. VIII(G)(1), ¶ 64
(Apr. 19, 2004) (Shahabuddeen, J., dissenting in part) (agreeing with the majority on
this issue).
282. Id. at ¶ 68 (agreeing with the majority on this issue).
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Court will find that the secondary liability assessment need not sat-
isfy the test it has already established for the primary liability claims.
The possibility exists that equitable concerns will force an interim
solution.  Nevertheless, ATS plaintiffs must recognize the possibility
that, absent further developments in international law, there simply
exists no cognizable complicity standard under the statute.
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